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Abstract 
Is the sovereign debt market information-sensitive to the true borrowing amount? If yes, does 
asymmetric information affect welfare? What mechanism can improve the welfare of 
transparent governments? To address these questions, this paper builds a sovereign debt model 
in which the government can be transparent or opaque. The model predicts that asymmetric 
information about the government’s type decreases the welfare of a transparent government, by 
either inducing a transfer of welfare to an opaque government through the market price or by 
leading to market breakdown. Building on this model, I develop a mechanism of inspection and 
penalties on cheating governments and conclude that bailout lending when market yields rise 
as a result of this information friction does not necessarily improve the welfare of transparent 
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In October 2009, the newly elected government in Greece announced a revision of the estimate 
for its 2009 deficit from 6% - 8% to 12,5%, saying that estimates provided by the previous 
government had been significantly understated1. It also revised Greece’s 2008 deficit from 5% 
to 7,7%2. Greek sovereign yields immediately soared.  
In January 2010, a report published by the European Commission3 said that Greece’s figures 
were “so unreliable that its budget deficit and public debt could be higher than the numbers 
claimed by the Greek government in October”. According to the news4, the report said that “a 
substantial number of unanswered questions and pending issues still remain in some key areas 
(…) and it cannot be excluded that this will lead to further revisions of Greek government deficit 
and debt data, particularly for 2008 but possibly also for previous years”. In April 2010, the 
estimate was again revised upwards and the final estimate is 15,2%5. In May 2010, Greece 
requested an official bailout from the IMF and the EU6. 
Although the Commission said that EU fiscal data were generally of high quality and that 
Greece was an isolated case, it also said that the EU lacked audit powers and so “relied heavily 
on the goodwill and integrity of member-states to supply accurate data”. Facts are that in 
January 2010 sovereign yields in Portugal also sky-rocketed, without any policy announcement 
at the national or European level about Portugal, and in May 2011 Portugal requested an official 
bailout from the IMF and the EU7. 
 
                                                          
1 Financial Times, October 20, 2009 “Greece vows action to cut budget deficit” 
2 Financial Times, January 12, 2010 “Greece condemned for falsifying data” 
3 Brussels, 8.1.2010 COM(2010) 1 final “Report on Greek Government deficit and debt statistics” 
4 Financial Times, January 12, 2010 “Greece condemned for falsifying data” 
5 Source: Eurostat 
6 IMF Press Release No. 10/176, May 2, 2010 
7 IMF Press Release No. 11/190, May 20, 2011 
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Figure 1: Greece’s sovereign yields (%)8 
 
Figure 2: Portugal’s sovereign yields (%)9 
 
                                                          
8 Source: Bloomberg 
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The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe revived the role that information might have on the 
sovereign debt market. Kletzer (1984) showed that lack of observability of the true amount of 
borrowing by a government leads to a loss of welfare, because lenders treat the government as 
a price taker rather than as a price maker. The loss of the first-mover advantage implies that the 
equilibrium of the market under lack of observability is weakly dominated by the equilibrium 
of the market under observability. Kletzer’s empirical motivation was the experience of the 
less-developed countries, during the late 1970s. The empirical motivation of this paper is the 
substantial rise of Portugal’s sovereign debt yields in 2010, shortly after Greece revealed that it 
had misreported its true borrowing levels. Although investors did not know whether Portugal 
also misreported its numbers or not, one interpretation is that the Greek revelation showed that 
it was possible to hide debt even within the EU. 
This paper therefore aims at building a formal structure to study the effect of not knowing 
whether a government can hide debt or not. Building upon the model, the second aim of this 
paper is to investigate the effect of allowing for a mechanism of inspection with penalties for 
cheating, which can be interpreted as bailout lending or as the introduction of penalty clauses 
on bond contracts enforceable by a supranational authority, on the welfare of a well-behaved 
government. Given the lack of such a clear supranational authority in reality, this paper can be 
best seen as a model of bailout lending under asymmetric information. 
The structure of this thesis is the following: chapter I studies the information-sensitivity of the 
market by building a sovereign debt model with one government type that is transparent and 
one type that is opaque, where type is private information to the government. It also studies the 
effect of asymmetric information on welfare. Chapter II develops a mechanism of costly 
inspection of the government’s true amount of borrowing and infliction of penalties on a 
government found cheating. Chapter III analyzes the extent to which the introduction of this 
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mechanism increases the welfare of each government type. The paper ends with a summary of 
the conclusions. 
2. Relation with the literature 
The central theme of the sovereign debt literature is the risk of repudiation. The breakthrough 
was made by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), where a theory about sovereign default was first 
developed. The theory says that sovereign lending exists in equilibrium to the extent that a 
government sustains a reputation as a good debtor. It is the fear of being excluded from the 
market following a default that keeps sovereign debtors repaying. In that sense, the more a 
country values inter-temporal consumption smoothing, for example, the higher the amounts of 
debt that it will be served by the market, since investors know about the government’s 
incentives to repay. This is called the reputational approach to sovereign debt and has been 
followed by several authors throughout time (Kletzer (1984), Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), 
Cole and Kehoe (1998 and 2000), Wright (2002) and Arellano (2008), for example). 
A parallel theory about sovereign default was developed by Bullow and Rogoff (1989), 
defending that lending to sovereigns is supported by the extent to which lenders have legal 
rights to impose sanctions on a defaulting government, such as impeding a country’s trade or 
seizing its financial assets abroad. This approach – the direct sanctions approach – differs 
substantially from the reputational one, since, precisely, the reputational approach lies on the 
assumption that sovereign lending does not, by the nature of a sovereign as an immune debtor, 
rely on collateral. Both approaches explain the existence of debt ceilings on governments debt 
(that is, threshold levels of debt above which lenders are not willing to lend, even though a 
sovereign might be willing to pay a higher interest rate) and both model the price schedule of 
loans as a decreasing price schedule on the amount borrowed (the higher the amount of the 
loan, the higher the relative incentive to repudiate on it, according to the reputational approach, 
and the lower the collateral per unit of debt, according to the direct sanctions approach). Both 
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these features induce a decrease on the welfare of the sovereign, when compared to perfectly 
enforceable debt. 
Formally, time consistency is a fundamental requirement when formalizing a sovereign debt 
market equilibrium, as sovereign debtors decide to pay or to default at each period in time 
weighing the loss of repaying against the loss of defaulting, as opposed to following a 
previously defined repayment plan. Accordingly, the planning/Ramsey formulation should not 
be used to formalize the equilibrium, since the latter does not require time consistency, when 
the agents can re-optimize within periods (that is, subgame-perfection in a sequential game). 
As a result of imperfect enforcement and sequential decision-making, the literature explains 
limited risk-sharing in the sovereign debt market between risk-averse sovereign debtors and 
risk neutral lenders (for example, Grossman and Van Huyck (1988)). Sovereign debt is widely 
modeled as state-non contingent bonds, because state-contingent debt is not sustainable in 
equilibrium when the debtor can repudiate on the contingencies established in the contract when 
it benefits from doing so.  
The introduction of the possibility to reschedule (or, more broadly, to renegotiate) sovereign 
debt enriched the descriptive power of sovereign debt models. Allowing for debt renegotiation 
impacts the debt ceilings imposed on sovereigns, since lenders can receive partial repayments 
(a model of partial default with a simple modeling of bargaining powers can be found in Sachs 
and Cohen (1982), while models of partial default with more developed bargaining processes 
can be found in Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989)). 
The problem of multiplicity of equilibria has been studied in this market. The ways in which 
multiplicity may arise are studied, for example, by Calvo (1988), Cole and Kehoe (2000) and 
Ayres, Navarro, Nicolini and Teles (2015). 
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Quantitative models have also been built with country-specific calibrations, allowing for 
positive explanations of empirically observed events in sovereign debt markets (for example, 
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008)). 
Although the sovereign debt market literature has developed continuously throughout time, the 
topic of information frictions remains relatively understudied. Kletzer (1984) was the first to 
bring about the role of the information structure in the sovereign debt market. Kletzer’s main 
insight is that lack of observability of the true amount of borrowing by a government leads to a 
loss of welfare, because lenders treat the government as a price taker rather than as a price 
maker. The loss of the first-mover advantage is abstracted from in the majority of sovereign 
debt models, since they implicitly assume that investors are able to know the amount of debt 
that they are pricing. The order in which players move that this introduces can be related to 
Ayres et al. (2015) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), since both those papers also change the 
usually implicit assumptions regarding the timing of the borrowing relationship. Lorenzoni and 
Werning explain it as a lack of commitment to previous borrowing announcements, since the 
borrowing needs of the government are only realized after lenders have fixed prices. In this 
model, I explain timing differences with asymmetric information. My model and those other 
two share in common the fact that all departure from the standard sovereign debt assumption 
of the first-mover timing, which leads to important qualitative changes in the results.  
Atkeson (1991) studies asymmetric information regarding the use of borrowed funds. He 
assumes that lenders are unable to observe whether the government uses loans for consumption 
or investment and assumes that lenders cannot perfectly inspect the use of borrowed funds by 
the government, for which reason the latter has incentives to overuse the funds for consumption. 
There, loan repayment is more attractive for higher levels of output and output increases with 
investment. The moral hazard potential to overuse borrowed funds for consumption makes the 
optimal contract demand high repayments when the realization of income is so low that it 
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indicates less than optimal investment. This information asymmetry and its consequences on 
the optimal debt contract are meant to provide an explanation for why state contingent contracts 
provide only partial insurance to risk-averse governments in face of adverse output shocks.  
The asymmetric information price schedule of my model accounts for the risk of debt dilution. 
Debt dilution risk and the resulting haircut on the price decrease welfare, by inducing adverse 
selection and increasing the cost of debt. Therefore, the search for a remedy to overcome the 
problem of debt dilution proves important. The topic of debt dilution and the study of remedies 
to overcome that distortion have been present in the literature. One proposed solution is the 
introduction of seniority clauses (see for example Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015)). However, 
remedies such as seniority clauses would not overcome the debt dilution problem if it arises 
due to asymmetries of information. The introduction of costly inspection is adequate to deal 
with unobserved action (see Townsend (1979)). Additionally, in my model, the mechanism 
designed does not suffer from the existence problem present in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), 
because the amount of the penalty is exogenous to the model. 
3. Chapter I: information-sensitivity of the market 
3.1 The baseline model  
3.1.1 Fundamentals (time horizon, agents, endowments and payoffs) 
There are two periods, denoted 𝑡 ∈ {0,1}. At 𝑡 = 0, the government receives an exogenous 
endowment of 𝑦0 = 0, and has a legacy debt 𝑐 > 0. At 𝑡 = 1, the government receives an 
exogenous endowment 𝑦1, which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, whose 
support is [𝑦0, 𝑦], where 𝑦 takes the value of 1. The government is risk neutral, does not 
discount the future and maximizes the following linear lifetime payoff over consumption: 
𝑐0 + 𝑐1 
A set of small investors has funds which they can lend to the government, in the form of state-
non contingent discount bonds 𝐵 at a price 𝑞 with one period maturity. Since lenders are small, 
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no individual lender can be a single lender to the government. Lenders are risk neutral, do not 
discount the future and are perfectly competitive. 𝜋 denotes the profit from investing in a 
sovereign bond. The expected profit at the time of the investment is: 
𝐸(𝜋) = −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 0 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
In equilibrium, the bond price 𝑞 must satisfy: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
The government can borrow 𝐵 from lenders at 𝑡 = 0. If 𝑞𝐵 < 𝑐, the government defaults at 
𝑡 = 0, since 𝑐 > 𝑦0. If the government defaults at 𝑡 = 0, it does not move on to period 1. If it 
repays, it moves on and receives 𝑦1 at 𝑡 = 1. At 𝑡 = 1, the government can either repay its loan 
and receive 𝑦1 − 𝐵 or repudiate on its loan and receive 𝑦0, the lower bound of the distribution 
of 𝑦1 (this default cost follows Ayres et al. (2015)). 
3.1.2 Information structure 
There are two government types: type 1 can only borrow 𝐵 and type 2 can borrow 𝐵 and 𝐻, 
with 𝐻 taking values in [0, 𝐾]. Within this environment, I analyze two information structures: 
first, a structure of symmetric information, in which the government’s type is public 
information; second, a structure of asymmetric information, where the government’s type is 
private information to the government. A type 1 government can be seen as a transparent 
government, which cannot deviate from the borrowing announcement made to the public. A 
type 2 can be seen as a government who can end up borrowing more than the amount announced 
by the time lenders fix the bond price. In the model, I say that a type 2 can hide borrowing.  
3.1.3 Motivation to borrow and gains from trade 
𝑦0 < 𝑐, which implies that the government needs to borrow in order to avoid default at 𝑡 = 0. 
If the government defaults at 𝑡 = 0, its payoff is 0. If the government repays, it moves on to 
period 1 and its period 1 payoff is bounded below by 0, since the government can repudiate on 
its loan and the default cost is a payoff of 0. Hence, borrowing at 𝑡 = 0 weakly dominates 
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autarky. Lenders make zero expected profits in a lending equilibrium, so they have a payoff of 
0 either by participating in the market or by not participating. So aggregate surplus is weakly 
higher in a lending equilibrium than in an autarky one. The gains from trade are the transfer of 
wealth that the government can make between periods through trading bonds.  
3.1.4 Timing 
Formally, the government’s type translates into a specific timing of the loan relationship, since 
private information regarding the government’s type introduces an information friction which 
is taken into account by lenders when pricing bonds. If the government is of type 1, it moves 
first by announcing 𝐵 and lenders move second, by offering 𝑞. If the government is of type 2, 
the government moves first by announcing 𝐵, then lenders offer 𝑞, but then the government 
moves again by choosing 𝐻. Both 𝐵 and 𝐻 affect the repayment probability of 𝐵, so lenders 
take into account what they anticipate the choice of 𝐻 to be when choosing 𝑞. In that sense, the 
government behaves as a price-taker in 𝐻. The timing of the game is the following: at 𝑡 = 0, 
both types announce 𝐵. Then investors decide 𝑞 through take-it-or-leave-it offers. Then, a type 
2 has another move, which is the choice of 𝐻. At 𝑡 = 1, income 𝑦1 is exogenously realized and 
a type 1 choses to repay or default on 𝐵 and a type 2 choses to repay or default on 𝐵 + 𝐻. After 
a default, both types enjoy the autarky payoff while repayment yields 𝑦1 net of paid funds. This 





3.2.1 Equilibrium under symmetric information and a type 1 government 






















A. Decision problem of the government 
At 𝑡 = 1, the payoff from defaulting is: 
𝑦0 
The payoff from repaying is: 
𝑦1 − 𝐵 
The payoff-maximizing government therefore repays at 𝑡 = 1 if and only if: 
𝑦1 > 𝑦0 + 𝐵 
At 𝑡 = 0, the government chooses the amount of debt to borrow (𝐵) in such a way as to 
maximize its lifetime payoff, knowing that it will optimally choose to repay or default at 𝑡 = 1. 
So the government chooses 𝐵 to solve the following problem: 
max
𝐵






The initial part of the objective function is the government’s payoff at 𝑡 = 0, which is its 
endowment net of bills plus the proceeds from borrowing. The second part of the objective 
function is the government’s expected payoff at 𝑡 = 1, which is either its endowment net of 
debt repayment or the autarky income, taking into account the optimal repayment choice. The 
repayment decision is probabilistic at 𝑡 = 0, since the distribution of 𝑦1 is public information.  
The decision to repay follows the spirit of the sovereign debt literature in that it is a strategic 
decision: a government repudiates on its debt unless its payoff is higher if it repays. However, 
this is not apparent in this model, since the default cost is modeled to be the lower bound of the 
distribution of period 1’s income. Hence, the choice to repay or default becomes mechanical 















B. Equilibrium bond price 
Since each creditor is small, under perfect competition the requirement for zero expected profits 
implies that they all offer the same price. Since the risk-free rate in this model is 0, the expected 
return of lending in this economy must be 0. 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
Since bonds are discount bonds, the equilibrium bond price is pinned down by the relationship:  
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 
The bond price is the repayment probability of the loan, since, for each unit lent, lenders receive 
one unit in case of repayment and zero in case of default. This bond price schedule is the supply 
of loan contracts, since it defines a set of pairs of loan amounts and prices that achieve zero 
expected profits, given optimal default behavior by the government.  
Moreover, lenders will not lend amounts of debt for which the probability of repayment is 0, 
so, in equilibrium, it must be the case that: 
𝐵 ≤ 1 
Imperfect enforcement is the reason behind a decreasing bond price schedule and credit ceilings 
on sovereigns. As the loan increases, so does default probability, which decreases the price. 
C. Equilibrium lending 
Equilibrium is defined as: prices clear markets given available information and quantities are 
optimal. An equilibrium is then a pair (𝑞, 𝐵) which solves: 
max
𝐵







𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 
𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 
𝐵 ≤ 1 
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The first constraint is the zero profit condition. The second constraint is the government’s 
budget constraint. The third constraint is the debt ceiling. The equilibrium borrowing amount 







√1 − 4𝑐 
This equilibrium amount is the minimum amount necessary to pay back bills 𝑐 and avoid default 
at 𝑡 = 0. The intuition is the following: a decreasing loan price schedule implies that the 
marginal benefit of debt is lower than its marginal cost, for any debt size. 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐵 = 1 − 2𝐵 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐵 = 1 − 𝐵 
While the marginal benefit of debt is its repayment probability, since that is what lenders receive 
per unit of debt in expected terms, the marginal cost of debt is the repayment probability of the 
loan in case of repayment and the default cost in case of default. Since the default cost is not 
zero (the government loses its period 1’s income), the expected cost of the loan is higher than 
its repayment probability. This results from the fact that, although sovereigns can repudiate on 
their loans, they do suffer a cost for defaulting, which is not received by the creditors.  
Since the government’s payoff is decreasing in 𝐵, there must be an upper bound on 𝑐 for which 
it is individually rational to borrow. Since the government’s payoff at 𝑡 = 1 is bounded below 
by 0, borrowing is individually rational insofar as 𝑐 can be raised at the prevailing price 
schedule. Therefore, borrowing is individually rational for 𝑐 < 𝑞𝐵. With 𝐵 optimally chosen, 
this yields the upper bound 𝑐 <
1
4
. These findings are summarized in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: With symmetric information, lending exists in equilibrium for 𝑐 <
1
4
 for a type 1 
government. 
Table 1 describes the market equilibrium as a function of c: 
Table 1: Summary of market equilibrium under symmetric information and type 1 
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Information structure Symmetric (Type 1 Government) 











































√1 − 4𝑐 0 
 
3.2.2 Equilibrium under symmetric information and a type 2 government  




A. Decision problem of the government 
The problem is solved by backward induction, as in the case of a type 1 government, except 
that there is one additional layer of decision making, which is the government’s choice of 𝐻. 
At 𝑡 = 1, the payoff from defaulting is: 
𝑦0 
The payoff from not defaulting is: 
𝑦1 − 𝐵 − 𝐻 

















𝑦1 > 𝑦0 + 𝐵 + 𝐻 
At 𝑡 = 0, after a type 2 has announced 𝐵 and lenders have offered 𝑞, a type 2 chooses 𝐻 to 
maximize its payoff. The choice of 𝐻 therefore solves the following problem: 
max
𝐻






The solution is that the hiding choice of a type 2 government is a corner solution: either 0 or K. 
Since lenders do not observe H, the price of B is not a function of H. In order for it to be 
incentive compatible for a type 2 to hide a positive amount of H, the price has to be sufficiently 
attractive. A sufficiently attractive price is a price that is sufficiently higher than the repayment 
probability of 𝐵 + 𝐻. Only in that case is the marginal benefit of loans higher than its marginal 
cost and it is optimal to choose a borrowing amount larger than the necessary to avoid default 
in period 0. Otherwise, the increase in consumption at 𝑡 = 0 attained through hiding is not 
enough to compensate for the cost in period 1 of that same hiding (an increase in repayment or 
a higher probability of default) and the government’s payoff actually decreases by choosing a 
positive amount of 𝐻. Formally, lenders choose to hide H if and only if: 
max
𝐵













This yields a discontinuous demand function for 𝐻: either 0 or K. In my model, since the 
government is risk neutral and the productivity of loans is their discount price, which, once 
fixed, does not decrease with loans, if it is profitable to borrow one additional unit once the 
price is fixed, it is profitable to borrow all possible additional units. Although a higher default 
probability decreases the government’s future expected consumption, the inter-temporal 
allocation of consumption is not a concern under risk neutrality.  
B. Equilibrium bond price 
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With perfect competition, the price schedule is pinned down by the relation: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
Since lenders cannot observe 𝐻, the supply of loans schedule is of the form: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑥 
Where 𝑥 is the conjectured level of hiding. 
Fact 1: With symmetric information about the government’s type, investors only lend to a type 
2 government on its demand curve. 
A demand curve amounts to an incentive compatibility constraint. In this model, since the 
choice of H is either 0 or K and since if lenders price H = 0 the price is sufficiently high for a 
type 2 government to deviate to H = K, a necessary condition for a lending equilibrium is that 
lenders price the default risk of K. So the equilibrium bond price schedule is: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾 
Moreover, lenders will not lend amounts of debt for which the probability of repayment is 0, so 
in equilibrium it has to be the case that: 
𝐵 + 𝐾 ≤ 1 
C. Equilibrium lending 
The equilibrium price schedule is such that there is no loan amount (including hidden 
borrowing) whose price can be higher than its repayment probability, so there is no opportunity 
for profitable hiding. Since hiding is unprofitable, the optimal choice of total debt is the 
minimum necessary to avoid default at 𝑡 = 0. So the equilibrium B solves: 
𝑐 = (1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) ∗ (𝐵 + 𝐾) 







√1 − 4𝑐 − 𝐾 
And the choice of 𝐻 is: 
𝐻 = 𝐾 
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Since hiding is unprofitable, the government will borrow as least as possible. That is achieved 
by decreasing 𝐵 by 𝐾. It must be IR for a type 2 government to participate in the market. Since 
borrowing is IR as long as it can raise its funding needs in the market so as to avoid default at 
𝑡 = 0, the binding constraint on 𝑐 is the price schedule. Since 𝐵 is decreased by 𝐾, the price 
schedule ends up being equal to that of a type 1, which yields the same upper bound on 𝑐. 
Lemma 2: With symmetric information about the government’s type and about the value of 𝐾, 
lending exists in equilibrium for 𝑐 <
1
4
 for a type 2 government. 
Under asymmetric information about total borrowing, the market is only in equilibrium if there 
is a price for which the demand for loans of the government yields zero expected profits. Here, 
however, an interest rate equilibrium is exactly the same as the equilibrium when the 
government is a first mover (the amount of debt is pinned down by c, regardless of whether it 
consists only of 𝐵 or of 𝐵 + 𝐾), because, when the price yields zero profits to lenders, hiding 
is unprofitable. So symmetric information does not dominate asymmetric information. 
Proposition 1: With symmetric information about the government’s type and about the value of 
𝐾, welfare is invariant to the ability to hide debt. 
Table 2 describes the market equilibrium as a function of c: 
Table 2 : Market equilibrium under symmetric information and type 2 
Information structure: Symmetric (type 2 government) 













√1 − 4𝑐 − 𝐾 0 
Equilibrium H 𝐾 0 
Equilibrium Price 
Schedule 























√1 − 4𝑐 0 
 
3.2.3 Equilibrium under asymmetric information about type 
In this section, I introduce the information friction, in the form of private type, that is, lenders 
do not know which government type they face when offering prices. This is meant to formalize 
the uncertainty regarding the level of transparency of countries’ borrowing data, after the Greek 
revelations. By solving the problem under asymmetric information, it is possible to draw 
conclusions about the information sensitivity of this market and the resulting impact on welfare. 
Definition 1: Asymmetric information about type consists of lenders believing that the 
government is of type 1 with probability 1 − 𝑃 and of type 2 with probability 𝑃. 




A. Decision problem of the government 
At 𝑡 = 0, a type 1 government chooses 𝐵 to maximize its lifetime expected payoff: 
max
𝐵






































And chooses 𝐵 to maximize its lifetime expected payoff, taking 𝐻 as given: 
max
𝐵






B. Equilibrium bond price 
Since a type 2’s choice of 𝐻 is optimally binary (either 0 or K) and since pricing 𝐻 = 0 makes 
it optimal for a type 2 to choose 𝐻 = 𝐾, which is cannot be an equilibrium (lenders would be 
making a loss), a necessary condition for the equilibrium price is that it assumes that a type 2 
chooses H=K. So, in equilibrium, lenders’ payoff must be:  
𝐸(𝜋) = −𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)) 
The risk of default is the risk of default of a type 1 with probability (1-P) and that of a type 2, 
with probability P. Equating expected profits to zero yields the following price schedule:  
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
Intuitively, if lenders are uncertain about the government’s ability to hide debt, they are willing 
to incur in a loss in case the government can indeed hide debt, as long as they incur in a profit, 
in case the government cannot hide debt. The price is unfairly low to a well-behaved 
government and unfairly high to a bad government. If a new lender lowers the discount price, 
the government will not prefer her loans, since the revenues per unit of debt are lower. If a new 
lender increases the discount price, she will make an expected loss, since a type 2 will continue 
to borrow K. So this is a Nash-equilibrium.  
C. Equilibrium lending 
This price schedule can implement a pooling equilibrium, in which a type 2 does not reveal its 
type (hence the equilibrium is consistent with lenders belief 𝑃) and hides 𝐾 (hence the price 
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schedule achieves zero expected profits) if and only if it is IC for a type 2. For a type 2, it is 
incentive-compatible to hide 𝐾 if the price is sufficiently high. Hence, a type 2 chooses 𝐻 = 𝐾 
and not 𝐻 = 0 if and only if: 
max
𝐵













At a price schedule of 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
It can be shown that this only happens if 𝑃 <
1
2
. In that case, hiding is profitable, for which 
reason a type 2 will mimic the choice of 𝐵 of a type 1 and not reveal information about its type. 
Therefore, the equilibrium 𝐵 for both types solves: 
max
𝐵







𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 





(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2
√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 
In order for this pooling equilibrium to hold, it must be IR for a type 1. The highest 𝑐 for which 
it is IR for a type 1 is defined by the price schedule, as usual. It is the maximum of the function 













), the market is in a pooling equilibrium, in which both types 
borrow the same amount of 𝐵 and a type 2 borrows 𝐾. The well-behaved government ends up 
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), this equilibrium is not IR for a type 1, since the price schedule becomes 
negative, but it might be IR for a type 2, since it can make the price of 𝐵 positive at the 
prevailing price schedule, by decreasing the demand for 𝐵 and borrow 𝐾. However, it will 






), lenders offer 𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾, there is market breakdown for a type 1 
government and a type 2 chooses 𝐵 to solve the same problem as with symmetric information:  
max
𝐵







𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑐 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾 
𝐵 + 𝐾 < 1 







√1 − 4𝑐 − 𝐾 
𝐻 = 𝐾 
The only lending equilibrium is then a separating equilibrium in which there is adverse 




which the is the maximum amount of funds that can be raised in an equilibrium with symmetric 




, this asymmetric information price schedule does not make hiding IC (the price is not 
sufficiently higher than the repayment probability of the loan to make borrowing payoff-
increasing). In this case, there is no zero expected profits price that can induce a bad type into 
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choosing the behavior it should choose for that price, except for a low enough price which 
makes it non-IR for a type 1 to borrow. 
So the only possible lending equilibrium is one in which lenders offer a price schedule that 
makes it IR to borrow only for a type 2. Hence, there is a separating equilibrium, in which there 
is adverse selection, since only a type 2 participates in the market. It is only possible to separate 









), since only then is it not IR for a type 2 to borrow at a type 2 price 
schedule (𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾). In this case, a type 2 will borrow 𝐵 and 𝐾 as in a symmetric 
equilibrium and will participate up to 𝑐 <
1
4
, which the is the maximum amount of funds that 
can be raised in an equilibrium with symmetric information and a type 2. These findings are 
summarized in Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3: With asymmetric information about the government’s type, lending exists in 






) for a type 1 and for 𝑐 <
1
4
  for a type 2, if 𝑃 <
1
2













) for a type 2. 
Table 3 describes the market equilibrium under asymmetric information, as a function of c: 
Table 3: Market equilibrium under asymmetric about type  
Information 
structure 
Asymmetric (Hidden Type) 






































√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 1: 𝐵 = 0 














𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 1: 𝐻 = 0 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 2: 𝐻 = 𝐾 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 1: 𝐻 = 0 






















































































I use as measure of welfare the highest level of financing needs at which a government can be 
served in equilibrium. The higher such an upper bound, the higher the welfare provided by the 
equilibrium.  
The government’s welfare increases with the opportunity to borrow in the market, because 
without borrowing the government defaults on its bills and cannot move on to the next period. 
In case the government defaults, it achieves a payoff of zero and does not have access to next 
period’s income, so his lifetime payoff is 0. On the contrary, if the government pays its bills, it 
can enjoy next period’s income. Although the government carries a debt burden into the next 
period, enforcement of loans is imperfect, which safeguards that the worst scenario for the 
government next period is to suffer the default cost of repudiating on its debt. Since default cost 
next period equals default cost this period (a payoff of 0), borrowing weakly dominates autarky. 
Lenders make zero expected profits in equilibrium independently of providing lending or not, 
so aggregate welfare in this economy is the welfare of the government. 
When there is symmetric information about the government’s type, lending exists up to the 
point where imperfect enforcement allows it to exist. The ability to hide borrowing does not 
distort welfare if the government who can hide borrowing has a linear payoff function in 
consumption. In turn, asymmetric information about the government’s type distorts welfare. 
Overall, asymmetric information makes welfare incomparable when 𝑃 <
1
2
 (either higher or 
lower for a type 2, depending on the parameters, but certainly lower for a type 1) and dominated 
by symmetric information when 𝑃 >
1
2
 (either no one is served or only type 2 is served). 
When there is asymmetric information about the government’s type, a government that can hide 
debt has advantages in doing so, if the price is sufficiently attractive. A government that can 
hide does not find it attractive to do it for every price. The price must be sufficiently higher that 
the repayment probability of its total loan (observed and hidden). This is so, because the 
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marginal cost of debt is higher than its repayment probability (since default is also costly). So 
the price must be sufficiently higher than the repayment probability of the loan to make the 
benefit of borrowing higher than its cost. This is the reason why, if a government cannot hide 
debt, the optimal amount of debt is the minimum necessary to satisfy the budget constraint. 
Since the marginal benefit of debt (the price) is its repayment probability and the marginal cost 
of debt is larger than its repayment probability, the optimal amount is the minimum necessary 
to allow the government to satisfy its budget constraint (the government only borrows, because 
borrowing is necessary to avoid default and enjoy next period’s income). 
If lenders are uncertain about the government’s ability to hide debt, they are willing to incur in 
a loss in case the government can indeed hide debt, as long as they incur in a profit, in case the 
government cannot hide debt. The price is unfairly low to a well-behaved government and 
unfairly high to a bad government. 
This asymmetric information price schedule makes hiding IC if the belief that the government 
is bad is lower than ½. In this equilibrium, a hiding government achieves a higher payoff than 
under symmetric information if the belief about being of the bad type is not too high and/or if 
financing needs are low enough. Indeed, although a bad type enjoys an unfairly high price, it 
also has to borrow an unnecessarily high amount of 𝐵 to mimic the behavior of a well-behaved 
type and keep its type private in this pooling equilibrium. Under a symmetric information 
equilibrium, a bad government optimally finances 𝑐 through both 𝐵 and 𝐾, whilst, in this 
equilibrium, it must finance 𝑐 entirely through 𝐵. Since the positive effect of a higher price is 
dominated by the negative effect of a higher 𝐵, having to pool is costly for a type 2. Hence, the 
welfare of a type 2 only increases with asymmetric information if the gain from hiding at a high 







√1 − 4𝑐 −
1
4






The left-hand-side is the gain from profitable hiding, which is the benefit form concealing its 
type. The right-hand-side is the cost of being in a pooling equilibrium, which is the price to pay 
to conceal its type. This inequality is satisfied if 𝑃 is sufficiently small (so that the decrease in 
the price schedule is small) or if 𝑐 is sufficiently low (so that the increase in 𝐵 is small). The 
welfare loss of a type 1 is the right-hand-side of the inequality. 
Lenders are equally well off under symmetric and asymmetric information, since they make 
zero expected profits in both cases. The one who loses with asymmetric information for sure is 
a well-behaved government, since it ceases to be served by the market if financing needs are 
too high and since its payoff at any given level of financing needs at which it is served is lower. 
The well-behaved government ends up paying a rent to a type 2 in order to be able to participate 
in the market. When this rent is too high, it becomes unprofitable to participate in the market. 
So there are two distortions on welfare in this equilibrium: on the one hand, a type 1 pays a rent 
to a type 2 (pooling equilibrium). On the other, there are lost gains from trade, since a type 1 is 
excluded from the market for values of financing needs at which it participated in the market 
under symmetric information (separating equilibrium due to adverse selection). When type 1 is 
excluded from the market, a type 2 does not receive a rent from type 1 and it is as well off as it 
is under symmetric information. In this case, a type 1 loses welfare that is no one’s gain. 
If the belief that the government is bad is higher than ½, this asymmetric information price 
schedule does not make hiding IC (the price is not sufficiently higher than the repayment 
probability of the loan to make borrowing payoff-increasing). In this case, there is no zero 
expected profits price that can induce a bad type into choosing the behavior it should choose 
for that price, except for a low enough price which makes it non-IR for a type 1 to borrow. This 
is a separating equilibrium, which only serves a type 2. In conclusion, if the belief of a bad type 
is high enough (𝑃 >
1
2
), the effects are that there is no lending for low levels of financing needs 
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(market breakdown) and, for high levels of financing needs, there is adverse selection in a 




, the binding constraint on the levels of financing needs at which the market 
provides lending to a well behaved government is the price schedule. Since the price schedule 
decreases with P and K (because P and K increase the risk of debt dilution) the higher P and the 
higher K, the lower the levels of financing needs at which a type 1 is still served by the market. 
The welfare of a type 2 in this pooling equilibrium is also decreasing in P, since it increases the 
cost of pooling, but, if P is sufficiently low, its welfare increases in K, since K increases the 
profit from hiding. These findings are summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: 
 If 𝑃 <
1
2
, asymmetric information about the government’s type induces a transfer of 
welfare from a type 1 government to a type 2. In this case, asymmetric information 
decreases the welfare of a type 1 and increases that of a type 2 only if P or c are 
sufficiently small. 
 If  𝑃 >
1
2
, asymmetric information decreases the welfare of a type 1 by ceasing to 
provide it with market lending and decreases the welfare of a type 2 by ceasing to 
provide it with market lending for low enough financing needs. 
 Under asymmetric information, when 𝑃 <
1
2
, a type 1’s welfare is decreasing in P and 
K, but a type 2’s welfare is decreasing in P and increasing in K if P is sufficiently low. 
4. Chapter II: a mechanism of costly inspection and penalties for cheating 
4.1 The model with the mechanism 
In this section, I allow for inspection to be conducted by lenders through the payment of a fixed 
monitoring cost 𝑀 and assume that inspection reveals the amount of hidden borrowing. If a 
government is found cheating, that is, if 𝐻 = 𝐾, it has to pay a fixed penalty 𝑥 to lenders.  
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Since I interpret this mechanism as an official bailout, the zero expected profit requirement is 
not imposed by perfect competition, but rather by official lenders setting a fair return to capital. 
I will only focus on the problem of a type 2 government and on the problem of lenders. A type 
1 government cannot hide, so its problem is the same as without the mechanism. Using the 
timeline of the game, I start in the moment where a type 2 government chooses to hide or not 
and use backward induction to compute the equilibrium of the market.  
4.2 Equilibrium with commitment to inspect 





A. The problem of a type 2 government 
Since the government knows lenders’ inspection decision when deciding whether to hide, this 






At the time that a type 2 government makes its hiding decision, 𝐵 is a given. So, assuming that 
lenders decide to inspect (the left side of the tree), a type 2’s expected payoff if it hides is: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0




Its expected payoff if it does not hide is: 
M ~M 
H ~H ~H H 
Lenders 
Type 2 Type 2 
𝑦0 B q H 
Type 2 
M 𝑦1 Default/repayment 
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−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




Hence, a type 2 government hides if and only if the former is higher than the latter: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0
+∫ [𝑦1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥]𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
1
𝐵+𝐾
> −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) +∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




This yields the following condition on the penalty to induce a type 2 not to hide: 







On the other side, if lenders decide not to inspect (the right hand side of the tree), the problem 
of a type 2 government is the one under asymmetric information without the mechanism.  
B. Equilibrium bond price 
Assuming that the penalty induces no-hiding, lenders’ payoff from inspection is: 
𝐸(𝜋) = −𝑞𝐵 −𝑀 + (1 − 𝐵)𝐵 
And the bond price schedule is pinned down by equating lenders’ expected profit to 0: 




Assuming that the penalty does not deter hiding, lenders’ payoff from inspection is: 
𝐸(𝜋) = −𝑞𝐵 −𝑀 + 𝑃𝑥 + 𝑃(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)𝐵 + (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐵)𝐵 
And the bond price schedule is pinned down by equating lenders’ expected profit to 0: 




If lenders decide not to inspect, the equilibrium bond price is the no mechanism price schedule: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
C. Equilibrium lending 
There are two possible equilibria by introducing the mechanism. In Equilibrium 1, lenders 
inspect and a type 2 government does not hide. In this equilibrium, the penalty is strong enough 
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to correct incentives to hide. Since it does not hide, lenders do not benefit from the penalty and 
must price in the monitoring cost in order to achieve zero expected profits. In Equilibrium 2, 
lenders inspect and a type 2 hides. In this case, the penalty is not strong enough to correct 
incentives to hide. However, in this case lenders extract a penalty from type 2 ex post. Hence, 
in Equilibrium 2, the price schedule of loans reflects not only the monitoring cost, but also a 
spread to cover for debt dilution risk (since a type 2 hides) and the prospect of receiving the 
penalty. Equilibrium 1 and 2 can coexist for the same levels of financing needs. The one that 
provides lending for the highest level of financing needs depends on the values of the 
parameters and is influenced by how the level of financing needs affects incentives to hide. 
In Equilibrium 1, incentives to hide increase with the level of financing needs, while, in 
Equilibrium 2, they decrease. Although the first-order effects of c on the benefit and cost of 
hiding cancel each other out in the two equilibria (both are the probability of default), the 
second-order effect of c on the cost of hiding is null in both equilibria, but its effect on the 
benefit of hiding is positive in Equilibrium 1, since c decreases the negative effect of M on the 
price and it negative in Equilibrium 2, since c decreases the positive effect of the inspection 
profit on the price. As such, Equilibrium 2 holds only if financing needs are low, since for high 
levels of financing needs, hiding becomes unprofitable for a type 2, which is not an equilibrium 
strategy. In turn, when the inspection cost and the penalty are both low, Equilibrium 1 holds 
also only for low levels of financing needs, since for high levels of financing needs hiding 
becomes profitable. As a result, Equilibrium 1 provides lending for higher values of financing 
needs provided that the penalty and the inspection cost are not too low, except when the penalty 
is sufficiently high and the inspection cost is sufficiently low, since the price under Equilibrium 
2 would benefit substantially from the expected profit from inspection. The remainder of this 
sub-section is technical and describes both equilibria. 












𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 











√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) 
And a type 2 chooses 𝐻 = 0. 
Introducing the equilibrium amount of 𝐵 on the constraint that the penalty deters hiding at the 







√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐))(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) 






, this condition is always satisfied. Otherwise, it imposes 

















, the constraint that the penalty is deterrent of hiding does not bind. 
In that case, since a type 2 does not hide in equilibrium, its payoff matches that of a type 1 and 
it is IR to borrow insofar as the bond market allows default in 𝑡 = 0 to be avoided. Hence, the 
binding constraint on c is the price schedule. At the schedule 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 −
𝑀
𝐵
, the function 𝑞𝐵 
attains a maximum of 
1
4










, the constraint that hiding is deterred is binding and it imposes 
















 is the following: in this equilibrium, hiding is deterred both by M (which decreases 
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the benefit of hiding through the price) and by x (which increases the cost of hiding). Since 
incentives to hide are increasing in c under the commitment mechanism, if both M and x are 






), the inspection cost and the penalty are high enough to make hiding 
unprofitable for any positive value of c (there is no value of c that makes the benefit of hiding 






), the price and the penalty are not 









)2 is the 







In Equilibrium 2, lenders inspect, but the penalty does not deter hiding, so a type 2 government 
hides. In that case, the equilibrium (𝑞, 𝐵, 𝐻) is the solution to: 
max
𝐵







𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 




Both government types borrow: 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2
√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 + 4(𝑃𝑥 −𝑀) 
And a type 2 chooses 𝐻 = 𝐾. 
Introducing the equilibrium amount of 𝐵 on the constraint that the penalty does not deter hiding 







(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2
) + 𝑃𝑥 
The intuition for this upper bound on c is that, in this equilibrium, incentives to hide are 
decreasing in c, since the second order effect of c on the price (through B) is negative. That is 
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the case, because a higher c decreases the per unit (of B) profit that comes from extracting a 
penalty from type 2. Therefore, since a type 2 hides in equilibrium, c cannot be too high.  
Moreover, if 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, the following condition must be met: 𝑥 > 𝐾2
1−2𝑃
2
. If 𝑃𝑥 < 𝑀, the 




Without inspection, the lending equilibrium is the one without the mechanism. Existence of 
Equilibria 1 and 2 are summarized in Lemma 4: 
Lemma 4: With a mechanism in which lenders commit to inspect the government, lending exists 

















































(1 − 2𝑃) or if 𝑀 > 𝑃𝑥 and 𝑥 <
𝐾2
2
(1 − 2𝑃) 
in an equilibrium in which lenders inspect and a type 2 government hides (Equilibrium 2) 
Tables 4 and 5 describe the market equilibrium as a function of c. 
Table 4: Market equilibrium 1 under commitment mechanism 
Information structure Asymmetric (Hidden Type) – EQUILIBRIUM 1 













c (funding needs) 𝑐 <
1
4









































𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 −
𝑀
𝐵
 𝑞 = 0 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 −
𝑀
𝐵
 𝑞 = 0 
Optimal Hidden 
borrowing 





























0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5: Market equilibrium 2 under commitment mechanism 
Information 
structure 
Asymmetric (Hidden Type) – EQUILIBRIUM 2 







Inspection cost 𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥 
𝑀
> 𝑃𝑥 
𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥 and 𝑥 >
𝐾2
2
(1 − 2𝑃) 𝑀 > 𝑃𝑥 and 𝑥 <
𝐾2
2
(1 − 2𝑃) elsewhere 































√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 + 4(𝑃𝑥 −𝑀) 
𝐵 = 0 
Equilibrium price 
schedule 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 −
𝑀
𝐵
+ 𝑃𝑥 𝑞 = 0 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 −
𝑀
𝐵
+ 𝑃𝑥 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 −
𝑀
𝐵
+ 𝑃𝑥 𝑞 = 0 
Optimal Hidden 
borrowing 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 2: 𝐻 = 𝐾 
𝐻
= 0 
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Figure 3: Parameter space of existence of commitment mechanism equilibrium 1  
 
In the graph of Figure 3, K and P are fixed, M varies along the vertical axis and x varies along 
the horizontal axis. The shaded areas in the figure are the parameter values for which a lending 
equilibrium exists for a non-empty set of positive values of c. Different shades indicate different 
upper bounds on the set of values of c for which the lending equilibrium exists. 
In the dark gray region, lending exists for 𝑐 <
1
4










)2. In the no-shade region, the set of positive values of c for which 
lending exists is empty. 
The upper bounds on c in each shaded region are determined by the constraint on c that binds 
in that region. In the dark gray region, the set of sustainable c is 𝑐 <
1
4
−𝑀, because the binding 
constraint on the highest sustainable c is the price schedule. So, in the dark gray region, the 
highest sustainable c is negative for 𝑀 >
1
4
, it is 0 at 𝑀 =
1
4
 and it monotonically increases as 
M decreases, until 𝑀 = 0, where the highest sustainable c is 
1
4
. The derivative of the price with 
Commitment deterring M M
Commitment c 0 M
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respect to the inspection cost is negative. If the inspection cost is too high, the spread charged 
for default risk plus the pricing in of the inspection cost per unit of debt are higher than the face 
value of debt and the price is negative. As the inspection cost decreases, the price increases, 
which increases the maximum of 𝑞𝐵 (price effect). 









)2, because the constraint 
that hiding is deterred becomes binding. So, in the light gray region, the highest sustainable c 
is 0 when 𝑀 =
1
4
. As M decreases, the maximum sustainable c increases monotonically with 








































)2 does not vary monotonically with M. On the one hand, a lower M increases the 
price schedule, which raises the funding ability at the prevailing price schedule (price effect). 
On the other hand, a lower M decreases the deterring effect of M, which lowers the maximum 


















 downwards, it decreases with M (incentives-to-hide effect dominates). When M 









)2 is 0, so lending is not restored for any positive c. 





In the graphs of Figure 4, K and P are fixed, M varies along the vertical axis and x varies along 
the horizontal axis. In Equilibrium 2, the binding constraint on c is always the constraint that 
hiding is not deterred. Hence, there is only one shade of gray. So in the shaded regions of the 















𝑃𝑥 and in the no-shade regions, the set of positive values for which lending exists in the 




 (which is always true if 𝑃 >
1
2




4.3 Equilibrium with no commitment to inspect 
Now, I assume that lenders make their inspection decision after having observed both the 





Given that lenders observe both the realization of 𝑦1 and the outcome of the contract, they can 
infer the type 2’s hidden action when 𝑦1 is realized in the interval [𝐵, 𝐾] since the two 
observables form a perfectly informative signal in that region of 𝑦1: if 𝐻 = 𝐾, default is optimal 
when 𝑦1 ∈ [𝐵, 𝐾], while if 𝐻 = 0, repayment is optimal. Hence, the observation of default leads 
lenders to update their belief about hiding to 1, while the observation of repayment leads them 
to update their belief to 0. Any other realization of 𝑦1 is uninformative about the probability of 
hiding, since hiding and no-hiding lead to the same contract outcome: both would lead to default 
if 𝑦1 < 𝐵 and both would lead to repayment if 𝑦1 > 𝐵 + 𝐾. So lenders cannot update their prior 
belief about hiding (P). The posterior beliefs about hiding as a function of 𝑦1 are the following: 
 
B B + K 1 0 
𝑦1 
Default must be observed; 𝑃 not 
updated 
Default implies 𝑃 = 1; 
Repayment implies 𝑃 = 0 
Repayment must be observed; 𝑃 
not updated 





A. The problem of a type 2 government 
Now the government does not know lenders’ inspection decision. Lenders’ expected payoff 
from inspection depends on whether they can update their prior belief about hiding or not. If 
they can, the expected revenue from inspection is 𝑥 if they update 𝑃 to 1 and 0 if they update 
𝑃 to 0. If they cannot, the expected revenue from inspection is 𝑃𝑥. Since there is no commitment 
to inspect ex ante, lenders inspect if and only if it is optimal to do so. 
These two possible levels of expected revenue from inspection give rise to two possible 
inspection strategies: if 𝑀 is such that 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, the government anticipates that it is profitable 
for lenders to inspect for every realization of 𝑦1. If 𝑃𝑥 < 𝑀 < 𝑥, the government anticipates 
that lenders’ strategy is to inspect if and only if default is observed for 𝐵 < 𝑦1 < 𝐵 + 𝐾. 
Assuming lenders’ strategy is to inspect if they observe default only if 𝐵 < 𝑦1 < 𝐵 + 𝐾 (partial 
inspection rule), the expected payoff from hiding to a type 2 is: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵




The expected payoff from not hiding is: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




So a type 2 government optimally hides if and only if: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵
+∫ [𝑦1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)]𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
1
𝐵+𝐾
> −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0









If lenders strategy is to inspect for every realization of 𝑦1 (full inspection rule), the expected 
payoff from hiding to a type 2 is:  
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−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0




The expected payoff from not hiding is: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




So a type 2 government optimally hides if and only if: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0
+∫ [𝑦1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥]𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
1
𝐵+𝐾
> −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) +∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




B. Equilibrium bond price 
The equilibrium bond price schedule is pinned down by the following condition. 




 and 𝑥 > 𝑀, the strategies of partial inspection and no-hiding form an equilibrium. The 
equilibrium bond schedule is therefore: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 
The penalty is so severe that the prospect of being inspected with probability 𝐾 (which is the 
probability of 𝐵 < 𝑦1 < 𝐵 + 𝐾, which is the region where lenders infer the hiding choice of a 
type 2) is enough to make it optimal for a type 2 not to hide. The expected cost of hiding is 
higher than its benefit. So the price that achieves zero expected profits does not need to reflect 




, this equilibrium does not hold, since a type 2 would optimally hide. However, if 
lenders increase the frequency of inspection to full inspection (which they optimally do as long 
as 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀), hiding may be deterred. If hiding is not deterred, there exists an equilibrium equal 
to Equilibrium 2 under commitment to inspect. If hiding is deterred, lenders lose incentives to 
inspect, since they update 𝑃 to 0 and inspecting becomes unprofitable. However, if they do not 
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inspect, it becomes profitable for a type 2 to hide. So there is no pure strategies equilibrium 
with no-hiding by a type 2 and inspection by lenders, as it does under commitment. However, 
since lenders’ strategy is binary (inspect/not inspect) and a type 2’s strategy is also binary (hide 
(K)/not hide), a mixed strategies equilibrium exists. 
If 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, it is profitable to inspect when lenders cannot infer hiding and when they can. 
Assuming that lenders inspect with probability 𝛾 when they cannot infer hiding (that is, when 
𝑦1 < 𝐵 or 𝑦1 > 𝐾), a type 2’s payoff from hiding is: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + 𝛾 (∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0




+ (1 − 𝛾)(∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵




A type 2’s payoff from not hiding is: 
𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0




So a type 2 government is indifferent between hiding and not hiding if and only if: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + 𝛾 (∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0




+ (1 − 𝛾)(∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵




= −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0

















In turn, assuming that a type 2 government hides with probability 𝜌, lenders are indifferent 
between inspecting and not inspecting when 𝑦1 < 𝐵 or 𝑦1 > 𝐾 if and only if: 
𝑃𝜌𝑥 = 𝑀 
So, as long as 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, the equilibrium price schedule in this mixed strategies equilibrium is: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 
This price schedule differs from the one prevailing in the high penalty equilibrium, with the 
presence of hiding risk pushing the price down and the presence of profitable inspection pushing 
the price up. 
C. Equilibrium lending 
Under no commitment, there are three possible lending equilibria. In Equilibrium 1, lenders do 
not inspect in equilibrium and a type 2 does not hide. In this equilibrium, the penalty is so high 
that it correctives incentives to hide. Moreover, it does not waste resources on inspection, since 
the government anticipates that it will indeed be optimal for lenders to inspect, so no 
commitment to inspect is necessary. Therefore, ex ante, lenders offer the first-best price. 
Equilibrium 2 with commitment also holds here, but only when 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, since lenders need 
incentives to inspect). The price is damaged by the risk of dilution, since a type 2 hides as well 
as by the cost of inspection but reflects the expected penalty to be extracted from a type 2. In 
Equilibrium 3, lenders inspect for sure when a type 2 reveals its type and inspect with 
probability 𝛾 in all other ex post circumstances. In turn, a type 2 government hides with 
probability 𝜌. Given that lenders need to have incentives to inspect ex post, there is no 
equilibrium that eliminates hiding risk, since a type 2 would need the threat of inspection to 
lose the incentive to hide, but it would not be IC for lenders to inspect if they anticipate no 
hiding. In this equilibrium, the price reflects some debt dilution risk and, additionally, the profit 
from inspection that lenders expect when they can update the belief about a type 2 to 1. 
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Equilibria 1 and 3 cannot coexist for any given level of financing needs, because, if the penalty 
is high enough to implement Equilibrium 1, Equilibrium 1 is necessarily implemented since it 
is incentive compatible for lenders ex post. On the contrary, Equilibrium 2 and 3 can coexist 
for some levels of financing needs. In both equilibria, incentives to hide decrease with c, due to 
the negative second-order effect of c on the price by decreasing the per unit profit from 
inspection. The one that provides lending for the highest c depends on the parameter values. 











√1 − 4𝑐 
And a type 2 does not hide. In this equilibrium (Equilibrium 1), a type 2 does not hide and 




, Equilibrium 2 under the commitment mechanism also exists without commitment, but 
only when 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, since when 𝑃𝑥 < 𝑀 lenders do not have incentives to inspect, which they 




, the equilibrium amount of 𝐵 for both government types under the mixed strategies 




(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀) −
1
2𝑥
√(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
And the equilibrium amount of 𝐻 for a type 2 government is: 
𝐻 = 𝜌𝐾 
In order for 𝜌 and 𝛾 to be meaningful, their values must be between 0 and 1. 𝜌 is always positive 
and the constraint that it is lower than 1 imposes 𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥. The intuition is that, for 𝑀 > 𝑃𝑥, 
there is no level of 𝜌 below 1 that leaves lenders indifferent between inspecting and not 
inspecting. Since lenders must be indifferent between inspecting and not inspecting when 𝐵 <
𝑦1 < 𝐾, a type 2 government would have to hide with probability higher than 1 in order to make 
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lenders indifferent between inspection and no inspection, which is meaningless. Since 𝜌 would 
necessarily be lower than the necessary value to equate the expected penalty with the inspection 
cost, lenders would optimally not inspect, which is not an equilibrium strategy of the lending 
equilibrium. 
The requirement that 𝜌 is between 0 and 1 does not impose constraints on c, since 𝜌 is defined 
as the probability of hiding by a type 2 that leaves lenders indifferent between inspecting and 
not inspecting, which is independent of the amount borrowed.  
In turn, the requirement that 𝛾 is between 0 and 1 does impose restrictions on c, since 𝛾 is 
defined as the probability of inspection that leaves a type 2 indifferent between hiding and not 
hiding and that trade off depends on c, through the impact that c has on B and the impact that 
B has on the benefit of hiding (determined by the price) and on the cost of hiding (determined 
by the default probability). 
For 𝛾 to be positive, either the inspection cost and the penalty are low enough (𝑀 <
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑀2, 𝑀3}, or 𝑐 must be low enough (𝑐 < 𝑐
∗∗∗). The intuition for this upper bound on c is 
the following: in this equilibrium, a type 2 must be indifferent between hiding and not hiding. 
Since the cost of hiding increases with 𝛾 and incentives to hide are decreasing in c, 𝛾 must be 
such that the benefit of hiding equals the cost of hiding, for a given c. Since incentives to hide 
are decreasing in c, there is an upper value on c for which the cost of hiding would be equal to 
the benefit of hiding through a positive value of 𝛾. Above such an upper bound, the benefit of 
hiding is so low that 𝛾 would have to decrease to negative values in order to decrease the cost 
of hiding up to the point of indifference between hiding and no hiding.  
The constraint that 𝛾 is positive does not bind if 𝑀 < 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑀2, 𝑀3}, because M  becomes so 
low that the benefit of hiding is very high (through the price) and 𝛾 does not need c to decrease 
the cost of hiding. In this case, the binding constraint on c is the price schedule. The price 
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schedule limits fund raising to the maximum of the function 𝑞𝐵, which attains a maximum of 
𝑐∗ at the price schedule 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀).  
For 𝛾 to be lower than 1, the inspection cost and the penalty cannot both be too low (𝑀 must 
be above 𝑀1) and, moreover, 𝑐 cannot be too low (𝑐 > 𝑐
∗∗∗∗). This is caused by the fact that, in 
equilibrium, a type 2 government must be indifferent between hiding and not hiding. Since the 
cost of hiding is a positive function of 𝛾, 𝛾 must be such that the benefit of hiding equals the 
cost of hiding, for given (x, M). Since, under this mechanism, incentives to hide decrease with 
c, if c is too low, the incentive to hide is so high that 𝛾 would have to be higher than 1 in order 
to raise the cost of hiding to the level of the benefit of hiding. Since 𝛾 is bounded above at 1, c 
has a lower bound (“incentives-to-hide effect of c”).  
Moreover, if 𝑀 < 𝑀1, 𝛾 is not lower than 1 for any pair (x, M). The intuition is the following: 
when M reaches 𝑀1, both the inspection cost and the penalty are low, so the benefit of hiding 
is very high (the inspection cost does not push the price down by much and the penalty does 
not push the cost of hiding up by much). Since 𝛾 must be such that the benefit of hiding equals 
the cost of hiding, the cost of hiding must be high and, below 𝑀1, that would require 𝛾 to be 
higher than 1, for any possible positive value of c. 
Lemma 5 summarizes the existence of these Equilibria under no commitment: 
Lemma 5: With a mechanism in which lenders do not commit to inspect, lending exists in 




 if 𝑀 < 𝑥 


























(1 − 2𝑃) (condition on x is always satisfied if P>1/2). 




, in an equilibrium in which lenders inspect and a type 2 government hides (Equilibrium 
2) 
And lending exists in equilibrium for both government types for 𝑐′′ < 𝑐 < 𝑐′, where: 
 𝑐′ = 𝑐′′ = 0 if 𝑀 < max {𝑀1, 𝑀5}  
 𝑐′ = 𝑐∗ and 𝑐′′ = 𝑐∗∗∗∗ if max {𝑀1, 𝑀5} < 𝑀 < 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀2, 𝑀3} 
 𝑐′ = 𝑐∗∗∗ and 𝑐′′ = 𝑐∗∗∗∗ if  max{𝑀2, 𝑀3} < 𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥 




, in an equilibrium in which lenders inspect with probability 𝛾 and a type 2 government 
hides with probability 𝜌 (Equilibrium 3).10 
Table 6: Market equilibria 1 and 3 under no commitment mechanism 
Information 
structure 








Inspection cost Any Any max {𝑀1,𝑀5} < 𝑀 < max {𝑀2, 𝑀3} max{𝑀2, 𝑀3} < 𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥 







𝑐 < 𝑐∗ 
 
𝑐 > 𝑐∗ 
 
𝑐 < 𝑐∗∗∗ 𝑐 > 𝑐∗∗∗ 






√1 − 4𝑐 𝐵 = 0 𝐵 =
1
2𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀) −
1
2𝑥
√(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 𝐵 = 0 𝐵 =
1
2𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀) −
1
2𝑥
√(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑀)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 𝐵 = 0 
Equilibrium 
price schedule 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 𝑞 = 0 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 𝑞 = 0 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 𝑞 = 0 
Optimal H 0 0 𝑃𝜌𝐾 0 𝑃𝜌𝐾 0 
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Figure 5: Parameter space of existence of no commitment mechanism Equilibria 1 and 3 
 
The shaded areas are the parameter regions where a lending equilibrium exists for a non-empty 
interval of positive values of c. The bounds of that interval differ with the intensity of the shade. 
In the darker gray region, lending is restored for 𝑐 <
1
4
. In the medium-dark gray region, lending 
is restored for 𝑐∗∗∗∗ < 𝑐 < 𝑐∗, while, in the light gray region, lending is restored for 𝑐∗∗∗∗ <
𝑐 < 𝑐∗∗∗. In the non-shaded regions, lending is restored for the empty set. 
The bounds of the interval of c values for which lending exists are determined by which 
constraints on c imposed by the prevailing equilibrium bind in each parameter region. In the 
dark-gray region, (𝑥 >
𝐾
2
), the market is in a lending equilibrium in which the government does 
not hide and lenders do not inspect. The binding constraint on c is the price schedule, which 
imposes that lending exists for 𝑐 <
1
4
. In addition, the inspection cost M must be lower than the 
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penalty x (the gray full line in Figure 5), so that lenders’ strategy (the rule of inspecting if and 
only if they see default when 𝐵 < 𝑦1 < 𝐾) is incentive compatible.  
In the light gray region, the market is in the mixed strategies equilibrium. Since in this region 
𝑀 > max {𝑀2, 𝑀3}, the binding constraint on the upper bound on c is the constraint that 𝛾 is 
positive, which is 𝑐∗∗∗. The constraint that 𝛾 is lower than 1 imposes a lower bound on c, which 
is 𝑐∗∗∗∗. Therefore, in this region, lending exists for 𝑐∗∗∗∗ < 𝑐 < 𝑐∗∗∗.  
In the medium-dark gray region, the market is also in the mixed-strategies equilibrium. Since 
𝑀 < max {𝑀2, 𝑀3} in this region, the constraint that 𝛾 is positive is not binding. So lending 
exists for 𝑐∗∗∗∗ < 𝑐 < 𝑐∗. The lower bound on c is the same as in the light gray region, because 
the constraint that 𝛾 is lower than 1 binds in the entire region below the black full line. The 
upper bound on c results from the fact that the binding constraint is now the price schedule. 
In the no shade region above the black full line (𝑀 > 𝑃𝑥), the set of positive values of c for 
which lending exists is empty, because the market is in the mixed strategies equilibrium and 
the constraint that 𝜌 is lower than 1 is not satisfied for any pair (x, M) if 𝑀 > 𝑃𝑥). 
In the no-shade region below the lower dashed parabola (max {𝑀1, 𝑀5}), the set of sustainable 
c is empty, because the constraint that 𝛾 is lower than 1 is not satisfied for any pair (x, M).  
In summary, starting at 𝑀 = 𝑃𝑥, the maximum sustainable level of 𝑐 is 𝑐∗∗∗. As 𝑀 reaches 
max {𝑀2, 𝑀3}, the upper bound on 𝑐 increases discontinuously to 𝑐
∗, which holds unless 𝑀 
reaches max {𝑀1, 𝑀5}, where lending is not provided for any 𝑐 in this equilibrium. For example, 
by taking a vertical line starting at 𝑀 = 𝑃𝑥 and moving downwards, a given value of c that is 
not sustained in a lending equilibrium in the light gray region becomes sustainable in the dark 
gray one, because, although the penalty is the same, M is lower, which increases the price, 
which increases the benefit of hiding, which increases the highest value of c for which a positive 
𝛾 equates the marginal cost with the marginal benefit, given that incentives to hide decrease 
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with c. The market may also be in Equilibrium 2, if 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, in which case the mechanism 














) + 𝑃𝑥. 
Lemma 6: There exists a set of parameters x, M, K and P for which 𝑐′′ in Equilibrium 3 is 
higher than 𝑐′ in Equilibrium 2. 
 
5. Chapter III: Who and when benefits from the introduction of a mechanism? 
A mechanism implements lending independently of the degree of asymmetric information (P), 
by controlling the behavior of a type 2 government. Controlling the behavior of a type 2 
government has both a negative and a positive externality on type 1. The negative externality 
is the cost of inspection, which is paid not only by the bad type but also by the well-behaved 
type. This decreases the mechanism price relative to the “no mechanism” price. The positive 
externality is the penalty, which, under some mechanism equilibria, is extracted from a type 2 
and given to lenders, but which ends up benefitting the good type, since perfect competition 
induces it to be priced in. So the penalty allows for some of the benefit from hiding to be shared 
between the two types. This pushes the mechanism price up relative to the “no mechanism” 
price. 
5.1 Does the welfare of a type 1 improve? 




without a mechanism it is not served by the market for any level of financing needs, the 
mechanism that restores lending for the highest c depends on the extent to which the mechanism 
reduces hiding risk and on the strength of these two externalities.  
On the one hand, the commitment mechanism, entails very frequent inspection. With the no 
commitment mechanism, the mixed strategies equilibrium entails less frequent inspection, so 
the price suffers a lower haircut due to this negative externality. On the other hand, the 
commitment mechanism is able to eliminate hiding risk. The no commitment mechanism is 
53 
 
unable to completely eliminate hiding risk, so the price is negatively affected the presence of 
hiding risk. Finally, both mechanisms are able to set up an equilibrium with frequent hiding, so 
both are able to let a type 2 benefit from the positive externality coming from the penalty. 
Lemma 7 describes which mechanism provides lending for the highest c for the parameters. 
Lemma 7: The inspection mechanism that implements lending for the highest c is: 


































Figure 6 portrays Lemma 7 in the (x, M) space. In the red regions a lending equilibrium exists 
only with the commitment mechanism. In the blue ones, lending is implemented by both 
mechanisms, but it is so for higher values of c under the commitment mechanism. In the yellow 
areas, on the contrary, lending in equilibrium exists under both mechanisms, but it exists for 
higher values of c under the no commitment mechanism. 




For 0 < 𝑥 <
𝐾2
2
, the commitment mechanism restores lending for the highest value of c either 
because the market is in the mixed strategies equilibrium under no commitment, in which case 
only the commitment mechanism is able to restore lending (red part below the bottom parabola), 
or because the market is in the common equilibrium under no commitment (Equilibrium 2), in 
which case either the commitment mechanism restores lending for the same values of c (since 
in can implement the same equilibrium) or the commitment mechanism restores lending for 
higher values of c, by implementing the no-hiding equilibrium (blue part), which restores 
lending for higher values of c than the common equilibrium if the inspection cost is high 
enough. The intuition is that those two equilibria inspect with the same frequency, so the 
strength of the negative externality caused by inspection is the same, and in the case of the 
common equilibrium there is hiding risk, which damages the price. If the penalty is low relative 
to the price, the positive externality coming from the penalty is not enough to compensate for 













 because it can implement an equilibrium with no-hiding (Equilibrium 1), which 
restores lending for higher values of c than the mixed strategies equilibrium under no 
commitment. The intuition is that both the inspection cost and the penalty are low, so deterring 
hiding by inspecting very frequently does not impose a very strong negative externality on the 
price and forfeiting the penalty because hiding is deterred does not waste a very strong positive 
externality. On top of that, there is no haircut on the price due to the risk of dilution. All in all, 
the price achieved in the no-hiding equilibrium is higher than the price achieved in any other 
                                                          
11 The region of parameters in which Equilibrium 1 implements lending for higher values of c than Equilibrium 2 
under commitment is not depicted in Figure 6, because both if Equilibrium 1 implements lending for higher values 
of c than Equilibrium 2 and vice-versa, the no commitment mechanism is dominated by the commitment 
mechanism when Equilibrium 1 under commitment implements lending for higher values of c than Equilibrium 3 
or Equilibrium 1 under no commitment. So it is the comparison between the commitment mechanism’s 
Equilibrium 1 and no commitment mechanism’s Equilibria 1 and 3 that dictates welfare. 
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mechanism equilibrium. In this region, the binding constraint on the no-hiding equilibrium is 
the price. When the binding constraint on the mixed strategies equilibrium is not the price, the 
constraint that binds imposes a tighter ceiling on c (either 0, in the red region above the large-
dashed black line, or a positive value, in the blue region between the large-dashed black line 
and the top parabola), so the upper bound on c under the no-hiding equilibrium is still higher. 
If the market is in Equilibrium 2 under no commitment, the commitment mechanism restores 













 because the no-hiding equilibrium implementable under commitment 
(Equilibrium 1) restores lending for higher values of c than the mixed strategies equilibrium 
under no commitment. The intuition is that, since the penalty is relatively high, and therefore 
its positive externality on the price is relatively strong, the no-hiding equilibrium only 
implements a higher price if the inspection cost is so high that a bad government would have to 
hide with a very high probability in order for lenders to be indifferent between hiding and not 
hiding, which is a requisite in the mixed strategies equilibrium. This damages the mixed 
strategies price by increasing dilution risk (blue region below the dashed parabola). If the 
inspection cost is not so high, then the positive externality coming from the penalty is stronger 
than the effect of dilution risk and the mixed strategies price is higher than the no-hiding price 
(yellow region below the dashed parabola). Once again, in those regions in which the binding 
constraint on c in the mixed strategies equilibrium is not the price, the constraint that binds 
imposes a tighter ceiling on c (0 in the red region above the large-dashed red line and a positive 
value in the blue region between the top dashed parabola and the large-dashed black line), so 
the no-hiding continues to dominate the mixed strategies equilibrium. If the market is in 
Equilibrium 2 under no commitment, the commitment mechanism restores lending for the same 
values of c as no commitment, since it can also implement Equilibrium 2. 
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Finally, for 𝑥 >
𝐾
2
, the no commitment mechanism restores lending for the highest value of c 
because it can implement the first-best price through a no-hiding/no-inspection equilibrium 
(yellow region on the right-hand-side of the graph). 




) a type 1 might be better off or worse off with the introduction of a 
mechanism, depending on the extent to which hiding risk is reduced with a mechanism and on 
the strength of the two externalities (the negative one imposed by the inspection cost and the 
positive one imposed by the penalty), which depends on the parameters. Indeed, the loss 
suffered by a good government due to asymmetric information might be higher with a 
mechanism than without a mechanism. 
Starting by the commitment mechanism, when the market is in the no-hiding equilibrium, the 
negative externality imposed by inspection is very strong, since inspection occurs very 
frequently. If the inspection cost is too high (above 𝑃𝐾(
2−𝑃𝐾
4
)), this negative externality is 
stronger than the haircut imposed on the price due to debt dilution under “no mechanism”. In 
this case, the upper bound on c imposed by the mechanism is lower than the one imposed by 






). So the adverse selection effect under no 
mechanism, although bad for a well-behaved government, is nonetheless less harmful than the 
negative externality imposed by the mechanism. This is represented in the (x, M) space in 
Figure 7 by the gray shade above the horizontal line.  
If the inspection cost is not so high (below 𝑃𝐾(
2−𝑃𝐾
4
)), then the opposite holds and introducing 
a mechanism is welfare-improving for a type 1 insofar as the binding constraint on c under the 
commitment no-hiding equilibrium is the price, which is not the case if the inspection cost and 
the penalty are both very low. In this case, the upper bound on c imposed by the constraint that 
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hiding is deterred is lower than the one under “no mechanism”. In this region of parameters (the 
light gray region in Figure 7), introducing a mechanism leaves a type 1 government worse off. 
Figure 7: Parameter space where “no mechanism” implements lending for higher c values 
than commitment mechanism Equilibrium 1 
 
When the market is in the hiding equilibrium, the negative externality imposed by inspection is 
very strong, since inspection occurs very frequently in this equilibrium too, but there is a 
positive externality coming from the penalty. On the other side, since hiding is not deterred, the 
mechanism price is damaged by the presence of hiding risk. So both the mechanism and the 
“no mechanism” prices are damaged by the presence of hiding risk. Only if the positive 
externality coming from the penalty is stronger than the negative externality caused by 
inspection, does the commitment mechanism restore lending for higher values of c than “no 
mechanism”. This happens if 𝑀 < 𝑀′. 
Going to the no commitment mechanism, the no commitment regime can only increase the 
parameter space where the introduction of a mechanism improves the welfare of a type 1 
relative to the space studied in the previous paragraph in the parameter regions where it 
dominates the commitment regime, which happens in the yellow regions of Figure 6. Hence, 
only if hiding risk is so low that it damages the price so little that “no mechanism” implements 
lending for higher values of c than the no-hiding commitment equilibrium for relatively low 
Commitment deterring M M Commitment c 0 M
no mechanism dominates M
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levels of the inspection cost can the no commitment mechanism increase the parameter space 
where the introduction of a mechanism improves the welfare of a type 1. That would require 
the full horizontal line of Figure 7 to be lower than the top dashed parabola of Figure 6. In that 
case, the no commitment mixed strategies equilibrium would attain the highest price by 
reducing hiding risk relative to “no mechanism” without imposing too strong a negative 
externality through inspection and by adding a positive externality through the penalty. Lemma 
8 summarizes these findings. 
Lemma 8: When 𝑃 <
1
2
, “no mechanism” implements lending for the highest c for a type 1 
government if 𝑀 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀′, 𝑃𝐾 (
2−𝑃𝐾
4
) ,𝑀2, 𝑀3} or 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀










 and if 𝑀 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀′, 𝑃𝐾 (
2−𝑃𝐾
4




Figure 8 portrays the description in Lemma 8 in the (x, M) space. The gray-shaded regions are 
the regions of parameters in which the introduction of a mechanism actually leaves a type 1 
worse off, when there is asymmetric information. 







In the gray region to the left of 𝑥 =
𝐾
2
, the introduction of a mechanism is actually harmful for 
a type 1, since no mechanism implements lending for a highest c for a type 1 than the no-hiding 
equilibrium under commitment, the hiding equilibrium under the two mechanisms and the 
mixed strategies equilibrium under no commitment. In the gray region to the right of =
𝐾
2
 , the 
introduction of a mechanism is harmful for a type 1, since the no-hiding/no-inspection 
equilibrium implementable under the no commitment mechanism is not IC for lenders. So “no 
mechanism” is not dominated by that additional mechanism equilibrium.   
5.2 Does the welfare of a type 2 improve? 
As for a type 2, the introduction of a mechanism leaves it better off only if 𝑃 >
1
2
 and financing 
needs are low, since in that case there is market breakdown for both types without the 
mechanism. When 𝑃 <
1
2
, the introduction of a mechanism surely cannot improve a type 2’s 
welfare, since there is no mechanism equilibrium that serves a type 2 for higher levels of 
financing needs than “no mechanism”. When a mechanism equilibrium serves a type 2 for lower 
values of c than “no mechanism”, a type 2’s welfare is unchanged, since it can always reveal 
its type and be as well off as under “no mechanism”. 
When neither type borrows without the mechanism, the welfare of a bad government decreases 
as a result of asymmetric information. Then the introduction of a mechanism can improve a 
type 2’s welfare, by restoring the market for levels of financing needs at which a type 2 is not 
served under “no mechanism”. Those levels are low levels of financing needs. However, since 
the measure of welfare is the *upper* bound on financing needs that can be financed in the 
market, the introduction of a mechanism does not leave a type 2 better off in this situation either, 
since a type 2 is still served under “no mechanism” when financing needs are high – only when 
they are low does the market not provide lending. Therefore, there is no parameter region in 
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which a type 2’s welfare is increased through the introduction of a mechanism, when there is 
asymmetric information in the market. These finding are summarized in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: With asymmetric information about the government’s type, a type 1’s welfare 
increases with the introduction of a mechanism when 𝑃 >
1
2
. When 𝑃 <
1
2
, a type 1’s welfare 
decreases with the introduction of a mechanism if 𝑀 > max {𝑀′, 𝑃𝐾 (
2−𝑃𝐾
4
) ,𝑀2, 𝑀3} or 






 and 𝑥 <
𝐾
2
 and increases elsewhere. A type 2’s welfare 


















), when 𝑃 >
1
2
. When 𝑃 <
1
2
, a type 2’s welfare decreases with the introduction of 
a mechanism for the entire parameter space. 
5.3 Does aggregate welfare improve? 
Overall, asymmetric information makes welfare incomparable when 𝑃 <
1
2
 (either higher or 
lower for a type 2, depending on the parameters, but certainly lower for a type 1) and dominated 
by symmetric information when 𝑃 >
1
2
 (either no one is served or only type 2 is served). 




higher or lower for a type 1, depending on the parameters, and equal for a type 2, since a type 
2 can always reveal its type and is served for as high levels of c as without any mechanism) and 
higher relative to “no mechanism” when 𝑃 >
1
2
 (lending is restored for a type 1 for some levels 
of financing needs and a type 2 is served for as high levels of c as without any mechanism).  
5 Conclusions 
The first main conclusion is that the sovereign debt market is information-sensitive to the true 
amount of borrowing. Under asymmetric information, welfare decreases for a well behaved 
government, because it is not served by the market for any level of financing needs if lenders’ 
belief that the government can hide is sufficiently high and, if that belief is not so high, there is 
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adverse selection for high levels of financing and each level of financing needs becomes more 
expensive to finance, which lowers its payoff.  
The rise in Portuguese sovereign yields after Greece revealed misreported deficit data could be 
interpreted, in this model, as a new equilibrium, in which investors held a higher belief than 
before that Portugal was not transparent, which would increase yields. The model’s prediction 
of market breakdown if the belief is too high is consistent with Portugal leaving the capital 
markets and requesting an external bailout. 
The second main conclusion is that allowing for bailout lending, with the possibility for official 
lenders to inspect the accounts of the government and impose penalties in case of cheating, 
might decrease the welfare of a well-behaved government relative to market lending, even 
though the market is charging an unfairly high yield due to asymmetric information. 
So even if sovereign debt yields rise as a result of uncertainty regarding the government’s 
transparency, if the market still provides lending, the market solution might still be the best 
solution, when compared to requesting an official bailout on the grounds that spreads are too 
high due to a distortion caused by information asymmetries. 
Comparative statics of the baseline model equilibrium on P and K also allow to conclude about 
the importance of a “reputation for transparency”. The lower the P and the K, the lower the 
decrease caused by uncertainty about the government’s type on a well-behaved government’s 
welfare. This would recommend countries to build a reputation for transparency, so as to 
decrease P and K. This could be accomplished, for example, through constitutional rules or 
independent fiscal bodies. One possible extension of the model is to study whether rewards for 
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17. Proof of Lemma 8 
 
 
1. Derivation of the price schedule for a type 1 government: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝐸(𝐵) = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐸(𝐵) 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦0 + 𝐵) + 0 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1 < 𝑦0 + 𝐵) 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵 ∗ (1 −
𝑦0 + 𝐵 − 𝑦0
𝑦 − 𝑦0
) + 0 ∗ (
𝑦0 + 𝐵 − 𝑦0
𝑦 − 𝑦0
) 




𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 
Debt ceiling: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. (𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦0 + 𝐵) ≥ 0 
1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. (𝑦1 < 𝑦0 + 𝐵) ≥ 0 
1 − 𝐹(𝑦0 + 𝐵) ≥ 0 
1 −




𝑦0 + 𝐵 − 𝑦0
𝑦1 − 𝑦0
≥ 0 
1 − 𝐵 ≥ 0 
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𝐵 ≤ 1 















𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 − 𝑦0 
𝐵 ≤ 𝑦 − 𝑦0 
max
𝐵























































(𝑦 − 𝑦0 − 𝐵)𝐵 
max
𝐵
























































































































































𝐵 ≤ 𝑦 − 𝑦0 




























√1 − 4𝑐 
𝐵 ≤ 1 
Since this is an inverted parabola with no term in B, its symmetry axis is x = 0. This means that 
its maximum is at B = 0. Since the government must satisfy the budget constraint, the solution 
to the maximization problem is the minimum necessary to satisfy the budget constraint, as long 















= 𝑐 − 𝑦0 
𝐵2
𝑦 − 𝑦0
− 𝐵 + (𝑐 − 𝑦0) = 0 
𝐵 =




































√1 − 4(𝑐) 
The equilibrium price is: 






























































√1 − 4𝑐) 
3. Marginal cost and marginal benefit of borrowing: 
























This can be re-written as: 
max
𝐵
𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝐵 −
𝐵2
𝑦 − 𝑦0






𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝐵 (1 −
𝐵
𝑦 − 𝑦0












4. Market equilibrium with perfect enforcement: 
The first-best contract under perfect competition would be the solution to the following 
constrained optimization problem: 
max
𝐵










Zero expected profits: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐸(𝐵) 
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𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵 









𝑞 = 1 
𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 − 𝑦0 
Inserting the price schedule into the government’s problem and solving for B: 
max
𝐵
𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝑞𝐵 +
1
𝑦 − 𝑦0






𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝑞𝐵 +
1
𝑦 − 𝑦0
































(𝑦 − 𝑦0)𝐵 
max
𝐵
𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝑞𝐵 + 𝐸(𝑦1) − 𝐵 
max
𝐵
𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝐵 + 𝐸(𝑦1) − 𝐵 
max
𝐵




𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 − 𝑦0 
So we see that expected utility is independent of the level of debt. Let us suppose that the 
government would borrow just enough to avoid default in period 0: 
𝐵 = 𝑐 − 𝑦0 
For 𝑦0 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 = 1, equilibrium would be: 
(𝐵 = 𝑐, 𝑞 = 1) 








5. Proof of Lemma 1 
Lemma 1: With symmetric information, lending exists in equilibrium for 𝑐 <
1
4
 for a type 1 
government. 
The condition for it to be individually rational to borrow the optimal amount of debt is that the 
overall expected payoff of the government is greater than 0, since defaulting in period 0 (and 
therefore not moving on to period 1) yields a payoff of 0. The condition is given below: 






√1 − 4𝑐 





It can also be seen through the maximum of the price schedule*B. 
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+ 𝑦0 − 𝑐 + 𝐸(𝑦1) ≥ 0 
For 𝑦0 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 = 1, 




































√1 − 4𝑐 > 0 
As long as 𝑐 ≤
1
4






√1 − 4𝑐, since 𝑐 <
1
4
 ensures that this condition 
is always satisfied. 
6. Proof that the optimal choice of H by a type 2 is a corner solution 
The hiding choice of a type 2 government is a corner solution: either 0 or K. 
max
𝐵

















Take 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑥 










By the time a type 2 government chooses H, q and B are a given, so the first part of the function 
is a given. The second part is convex in H (decreasing). It reaches a minimum at x=H. In order 
for hiding H to increase the expected payoff of a type 2 government, the payoff form hiding H 
has to be greater than the payoff of not hiding, that is: 






















So, if 𝑥 <
𝐻
2
, it is optimal to choose the maximum H possible, which is K. However, any other 
choice of H would not be an equilibrium, since lenders would be making negative expected 




, it is optimal to choose H=0. But this would not be an equilibrium either, because 
lenders would be making a positive expected profit, since they would be pricing a default risk 
higher than that corresponding to H=0. 
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7. Price derivation for a type 2 government: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝐸(𝐵) = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐸(𝐵) 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1 ≥ 𝑦0 + 𝐵 + 𝐻) + 0 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1 < 𝑦0 + 𝐵) 




For 𝑦0 = 0 and 𝑦1 = 1, this is: 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − (𝐵 + 𝐻) 
8. Market equilibrium for a type 2 government: 
max
𝐵







𝑞 ∗ (𝐵 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑐 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾 
𝐵 + 𝐾 < 1 
Solution: 
Since the choice of H is a corner choice (either 0 or H) and since if lenders price H=0 there is 
no way a type 2 government will not hide K, a necessary condition for a lending equilibrium 
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(that is, at least B positive) is that lenders price the default risk of K and the government needs 
to borrow B and K. That is given by B that solves: 








√1 − 4𝑐 − 𝐾 







√1 − 4𝑐 − 𝐾 
𝐻 = 𝐾 
9. Equilibrium price under asymmetric information 
The zero expected profits condition is now: 
𝐸(𝜋) = −𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)) 
𝐸(𝜋) = 0 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)) = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝑃𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + (1 − 𝑃)𝐵(1 − 𝐵) 
𝑞 = 𝑃(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐵) 
𝑞 = 𝑃 − 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 + 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃 + 𝑃𝐵 
𝑞 = −𝑃𝐾 + 1 − 𝐵 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
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10. Market equilibrium under asymmetric information 
The equilibrium if the government is of type 1 is the pair (𝑞, 𝐵) that solves: 
max
𝐵







𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
𝐵 < 1 
The equilibrium if the government is of type 2 is the trio (𝑞, 𝐵, 𝐾) that solves: 
max
𝐵







𝑞𝐵 ≥ 𝑐 
𝑞(𝐵) = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
𝐵 + 𝐾 < 1 
In a lending equilibrium under asymmetric information, a type 2 government must satisfy its 
budget constraint entirely through B, because otherwise a type 2 reveals itself, lenders would 
adapt the price schedule (decrease it) and a type 2 would be worse-off. 




(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2
√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 
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(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2








11. Proof of Lemma 3 
Lemma 3: With asymmetric information about the government’s type, lending exists in 






) for a type 1 and for 𝑐 <
1
4
  for a type 2, if 𝑃 <
1
2













) for a type 2. 
It must be incentive compatible for a type 2 to hide borrowing, since hiding has benefits given 
that the price is higher than 1-B-K, but it also has the cost of a higher debt burden in 𝑡 = 1, 
which increases the default probability and default is costly. A type 2’s payoff from choosing 
H=K is: 






While the payoff from choosing H=0 is: 






So a type 2 chooses H=K if and only if: 

















Maximum of the function 𝑞𝐵 at 𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾: 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝑐 
(1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾)𝐵 = 𝑐 
𝐵 − 𝐵2 − 𝑃𝐵𝐾 = 𝑐 
−𝐵2 + 𝐵(1 − 𝑃𝐾) − 𝑐 = 0 
Taking the maximizer: 
𝑑(−𝐵2 + 𝐵(1 − 𝑃𝐾) − 𝑐)
𝑑𝐵
= 0 




Computing the maximum: 





























), then a type 2 
government is unable to raise enough financing to cover c only through B, which implies that 
a type 2 reveals itself. 
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12. Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2: 
 If 𝑃 <
1
2
, asymmetric information about the government’s type induces a transfer of 
welfare from a type 1 government to a type 2. In this case, asymmetric information 
decreases the welfare of a type 1 and increases that of a type 2 only if P or c are 
sufficiently small. 
 If  𝑃 >
1
2
, asymmetric information decreases the welfare of a type 1 by ceasing to 
provide it with market lending and decreases the welfare of a type 2 by ceasing to 
provide it with market lending for low enough financing needs. 
 Under asymmetric information, when 𝑃 <
1
2
, a type 1’s welfare is decreasing in P and 
K, but a type 2’s welfare is decreasing in P and increasing in K if P is sufficiently low. 















































13. Proof of Lemma 4 
Equilibrium 1 (inspect, not hide): 
Notice, first, that the default probability of the government is not affected by the existence of a 
hiding penalty, since the hiding penalty does not affect the rule for optimal default: 
Assuming inspection, a type 2 that hides optimally defaults iff: 
𝑦1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾 − 𝑥 < 𝑦0 − 𝑥 
That is, 
𝑦1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾 < 𝑦0 
Which is the same rule on the income realization as without the penalty. 
Assuming inspection, the expected payoff from hiding is the following: 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0














−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − (𝐵 − 0)𝑥 − (𝐵 + 𝐾 − 𝐵)𝑥 +
(12 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)2)
2
− (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐵𝑥 − 𝐾𝑥 +
(12 − 𝐵2 − 2𝐵𝐾 − 𝐾2)
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥)
+ (𝐵 + 𝐾)(𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) 









− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)2 + (𝐵 + 𝐾)𝑥 
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− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) + 𝐵2 + 2𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾2
+ (𝐵 + 𝐾)𝑥 









− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) 
Expected payoff from not hiding: 







For this equilibrium to hold, the penalty must deter hiding. The type 2 government optimally 
does not hide iff: 
















𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− (𝐾 + 𝑥) < 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 − 𝑥 < 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 < 𝑥 





𝑞𝐾 < −𝐵𝐾 −
𝐾2
2
+ (𝐾 + 𝑥) < 0 
𝑞𝐾 < (1 − 𝐵 −
𝐾
2
)𝐾 + 𝑥 
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That is, if the benefit of hiding (the price) is lower than the cost of hiding (the penalty plus the 
cost of repaying K or defaulting on K (which is to have GDP equal to 0). 
Assuming that a type 2 government does not hide, the zero profits price is: 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀 = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀 




Inserting the price schedule, the necessary penalty is therefore: 
(1 − 𝐵 −
𝑀
𝐵
)𝐾 < (1 − 𝐵 −
𝐾
2
)𝐾 + 𝑥 







)𝐾 + 𝑥 
Re-writing, the minimum deterring penalty under commitment to inspect is: 







Solving for B and then replacing B for its optimal expression, we get: 
The price in this equilibrium is: 










√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) 
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(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) −
1
2
√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐)(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) 
1
2
√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐)(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) >
1
2
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 2𝑀𝐾 
√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐)(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) > (𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾 
√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) >
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥)
 
If (𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾 < 0, this is always satisfied. Re-writing: 
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If (𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾 > 0, then: 
1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) > (




(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥)
)2 > 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) 
1 − 4𝑀 − (
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥) − 4𝑀𝐾
(𝐾2 − 2𝑥)

















































The price schedule imposes an upper bound on c, given by the maximum of this (concave) 
function: 
𝑞𝐵 

























































































































𝑀(2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2 + 2𝑀𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2) + 4𝑀2𝐾2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2
< 0 
𝑀(2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2 + 2𝑀𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2) + 4𝑀2𝐾2 < 0 
𝑀(2𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2) + (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2) + 4𝑀2𝐾2 < 0 
(2𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2) + (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2) + 4𝑀𝐾2 < 0 
4𝑀𝐾2 < −2𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2) − (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)2 
4𝑀𝐾2 < (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)(−2𝐾 − (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)) 
4𝑀𝐾2 < (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)(−2𝐾 − 2𝑥 + 𝐾2) 
𝑀 <















. This is so, since the value that the functions take when 





















First derivative of 
(2𝑥−𝐾2)(−2𝐾−2𝑥+𝐾2)
4𝐾2
 wrt x: 
2(−2𝐾 − 2𝑥 + 𝐾2) + (2𝑥 − 𝐾2)(−2)
4𝐾2
= 
2(−2𝐾 − 2𝑥 + 𝐾2) − 2(2𝑥 − 𝐾2)
4𝐾2
= 























Since the second derivative is negative, the function is concave.  
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The value of the function at 𝑀 = 0 is 
𝐾2
2







takes at 𝑀 = 0. The value that the function takes at 𝑥 = 0 is: 







































− 𝐾) = 
𝐾
4
(2 − 𝐾) 



















Because 𝐾 < 1, by assumption. 
Q.E.D. 
Expected payoff of the government under a commitment equilibrium: 


















































√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) +
1




































√1 − 4(𝑀 + 𝑐) −
1
4































Equilibrium 2: (inspect, hide): 
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Assuming inspection, a type 2 government optimally hides iff: 
















𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− (𝐾 + 𝑥) > 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 − 𝑥 > 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 > 𝑥 





𝑞𝐾 > −𝐵𝐾 −
𝐾2
2
+ (𝐾 + 𝑥) < 0 
𝑞𝐾 > (1 − 𝐵 −
𝐾
2
)𝐾 + 𝑥 
That is, if the benefit of hiding (the price) is higher than the cost of hiding (the penalty plus the 
cost of repaying K or defaulting on K (which is to have GDP equal to 0). 
Assuming that a type 2 government hides, the zero profits price is: 
−𝑞𝐵 + (1 − 𝑃)[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀] + 𝑃[𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) −𝑀 + 𝑥] = 0 







Inserting the price schedule, the necessary penalty not to hide is therefore: 






)𝐾 > (1 − 𝐵 −
𝐾
2
)𝐾 + 𝑥 
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)𝐾 + 𝑥 
























) < 𝐾 (
𝐵𝐾 − 2𝑀 − 2𝐵𝑃𝐾
2𝐵
) 
𝑥 < 𝐾 (
𝐵𝐾 − 2𝑀 − 2𝐵𝑃𝐾
2(𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾)
) 
Re-writing isolating B: 
2(𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾)𝑥 < 𝐾(𝐵𝐾 − 2𝑀 − 2𝐵𝑃𝐾) 
2𝐵𝑥 − 𝐾2𝐵 + 2𝐵𝑃𝐾2 < −2𝐾𝑀 + 2𝑃𝐾𝑥 
𝐵(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) < 2𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 2𝐾𝑀 
𝐵 <
2𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 2𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
 
Numerator: 
2𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 2𝐾𝑀 > 0 
2𝑃𝐾𝑥 > 2𝑀𝐾 




2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2 > 0 








, this always holds. 
So, if 𝑃 >
1
2
, for this threshold level of B to be positive (and therefore for this equilibrium to 
exist), 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀 must hold. 
Solving for B and then replacing B for its optimal expression, we get: 
The price in this equilibrium is: 







The expression for optimal B is: 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2
√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 + 4(𝑃𝑥 −𝑀) 
So we get: 
1
2
(1 − 𝑃𝐾) −
1
2
√(1 − 𝑃𝐾)2 − 4𝑐 + 4(𝑃𝑥 −𝑀) <
2𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 2𝐾𝑀









(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2









(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2
) + 𝑃𝑥 
So, if 𝑃 >
1
2















) + 𝑃𝑥 if P𝑥 > 𝑀 























(1 − 2𝑃) or if 𝑃𝑥 < 𝑀 and 𝑥 <
𝐾2
2
(1 − 2𝑃) 
















) + 𝑃𝑥 is necessarily IR for a 
type 1, since it is a tighter ceiling than the one imposed by the prevailing price schedule (which 
is the maximum value that c can take in order for borrowing to be IR for a type 1). This is 
proven by contradiction: since B is an equal function of c for both government types, the payoff 
of not hiding has a higher derivative (in absolute terms) than the payoff of hiding, otherwise the 
payoff of hiding would not be higher than the payoff of not hiding. If there were some 𝑐′ such 
that 𝑞𝐵 < 0 but the payoff of hiding was higher than the payoff of not hiding, then the payoff 
of hiding would be higher than the payoff of not hiding for every 𝑐 > 𝑐′. Therefore, the upper 
bound on c imposed by the requirement that hiding is IC for a type 2 must be lower than the 
upper bound imposed by the requirement that 𝑞𝐵 > 𝑐 at the prevailing market price, which is 
the requirement that makes borrowing IR for a type 1. 
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14. Proof of Lemma 5 
Equilibrium 1: 
Expected payoff under hiding: 
𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + ∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵














𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − (𝐵 + 𝐾 − 𝐵)𝑥 + (
12 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
) − (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝐵 + 𝐾) 
𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 + (
12 − 𝐵2 − 2𝐵𝐾 − 𝐻2
2
) − (𝐵 + 𝐾) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)2 









− (𝐵 + 𝐾) + 𝐵2 + 2𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾2 









− (𝐵 + 𝐾) 








Assuming that lenders inspect if default is perfectly informative, the government hides if and 
only if the difference in expected payoffs is negative: 
𝑞𝐾 − 𝐾𝑥 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 < 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2













The price that yields zero expected profits when the government does not hide (and given the 
rule for inspecting, lenders do not inspect), is: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 
So the penalty becomes: 








The expected payoff of the government is: 







Plugging in the zero expected profits price 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 
The expected payoff of the government becomes: 






− 𝐵 = 
















Conditions on parameters of Equilibrium 1: 
When the penalty is high, the first-best price is implemented by the mechanism. Lenders do not 
inspect, in equilibrium, and a type 2 government does not hide. 
The price is: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 






√1 − 4𝑐 
The price schedule imposes an upper bound on c, given by the maximum of this (concave) 
function: 
𝑞𝐵 
(1 − 𝐵)𝐵 

































Second, the price cannot be negative. It never is. 
Third, the penalty has to be effective in deterring hiding. This does not impose any constraint 





Fourth, lenders must have incentives to inspect, so: 




𝑀 < 𝑃𝑥 < 𝑥 
Assuming that lenders inspect when it pays off and assuming a mixed strategy for a type 2 
government, the government’s payoff from hiding is the following: 
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−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + 𝛾 (∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
0




+ (1 − 𝛾)(∫ (0)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵
0
+∫ (0 − 𝑥)𝑑𝐹(𝑦1)
𝐵+𝐾
𝐵




−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) + 𝛾 ((𝐵 + 𝐾)(−𝑥) +
12 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
− (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)(𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥)))
+ (1 − 𝛾)(𝐾(−𝑥) +
12 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
− (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝐵 + 𝐾)) 






− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)(𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥))






− (𝐵 + 𝐾) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)2) 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
2
+ 𝛾 (−𝑥(𝐵 + 𝐾) −
(𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)𝑥 + (𝐵 + 𝐾)2)
+ (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑥𝐾 −
(𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)2) 






− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥))
+ (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑥𝐾 +
(𝐵 + 𝐾)2
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾)) 






− (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑥𝐾) 
Expected payoff of not hiding: 
99 
 





















𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 − 𝑥𝛾 + −𝑥𝐾(1 − 𝛾) = 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 = 𝑥𝛾 + 𝑥𝐾(1 − 𝛾) 
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾
2
− 1) = 𝑥𝛾 + 𝑥𝐾 − 𝑥𝐾𝛾 
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾
2
− 1) − 𝑥𝐾 = 𝛾(𝑥 − 𝑥𝐾) 
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾
2
− 1) − 𝑥𝐾 = 𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) 
𝛾 =
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾




𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾




Expected payoff of hiding: 
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− (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝛾 (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾)




+ (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾)






𝐾 (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
𝐾
((𝐵 + 𝐾 − 𝐵)(−𝑥)))
+ 𝐵 (𝛾 (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
𝐵
(𝐵 − 0)(−𝑥)) + (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾)))
+ (1
− (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝛾 (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)
(





1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)
(1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥))
+ (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)
(





1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)
(1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝐵 + 𝐾))) 
𝐾(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥) + 𝐵 (𝛾(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥) + (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾)))
+ (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾))(𝛾 (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1 + 𝐵 + 𝐾
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾 + 𝑥))
+ (1 − 𝛾)(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1 + 𝐵 + 𝐾
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾))) 
𝐾(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝑥) + 𝐵(−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝛾𝑥)
+ (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)) (−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1 + 𝐵 + 𝐾
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝛾𝑥) 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝐵𝛾𝑥 + (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)) (
1 + 𝐵 + 𝐾
2
− (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝛾𝑥) 
−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝐵𝛾𝑥 + (1 − (𝐵 + 𝐾)) (





−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝐵𝛾𝑥 +
1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾
2
− 𝛾𝑥 − (𝐵 + 𝐾) (
1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾
2
) + (𝐵 + 𝐾)𝛾𝑥 















+ 𝐵𝛾𝑥 + 𝐾𝛾𝑥 



















−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 +
1
2




−𝑐 + 𝑞(𝐵 + 𝐾) +
1
2










− (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝛾(𝑥 − 𝐾𝑥) 






− (𝐵 + 𝐾) − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) 
Expected payoff from not hiding: 





















𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 − 𝐾𝑥 − 𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) = 0 
𝑞𝐾 + 𝐵𝐾 +
𝐾2
2
− 𝐾 − 𝐾𝑥 = 𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) 
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾
2




𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾
2 − 1 − 𝑥)
𝑥(1 − 𝐾)
 
Expected payoff from inspecting: 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃[𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀)]
+ (1 − 𝑃)[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀] 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝜌)(−(1 − 𝐾)𝑀)]
+ (1 − 𝑃)[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀] 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀) + 𝑃(1 − 𝜌)(−(1 − 𝐾)𝑀)
+ (1 − 𝑃)[−(1 − 𝐾)𝑀] 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌(1 − 𝐾)𝑀
− (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 
Expected profit from partial inspection: 
−𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃[𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀)) + (1 − 𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵))] + (1 − 𝑃)[𝐵(1 − 𝐵)] 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝑃[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀))] + (1 − 𝑃)𝐵(1 − 𝐵) 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀)) 
Mix iff: 
= −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌(1 − 𝐾)𝑀
− (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 = −𝑞𝐵 + 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀)) 
= 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐾)𝑀
= 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀)) 
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= 𝑃𝜌(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − (1 − 𝑃)(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 = 𝑃𝜌𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀) 
= 𝑃𝜌(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌𝑀 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑀 − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀 + 𝑃(1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑥
+ 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑀 = 0 
= 𝑃𝜌(𝑥 −𝑀) + 𝑃𝜌𝑀 − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑥 = 0 
= 𝑃𝜌𝑥 − 𝑃𝜌𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌𝑀 − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑥 = 0 
𝑃𝜌𝑥 − (1 − 𝐾)𝑀 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾𝑥 = 0 










−𝑞𝐵 + 𝐾[𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵))]
+ 𝐵 [𝛾(𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀))
+ (1 − 𝛾) (𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)))]
+ (1
− (𝐵 + 𝐾)) [𝛾(𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀))
+ (1 − 𝛾) (𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)))] = 0 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐾[𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵))]
+ (1 − 𝐾) [𝛾(𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾) + 𝑥 −𝑀) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀))
+ (1 − 𝛾) (𝑃𝜌(𝐵(1 − 𝐵 − 𝐾)) + (1 − 𝑃𝜌)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵)))] 
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𝑞𝐵 = 𝐾[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥 −𝑀)]
+ (1 − 𝐾)[𝛾(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) −𝑀 + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾 + 𝑥))
+ (1 − 𝛾)(𝐵(1 − 𝐵) + 𝑃𝜌(−𝐵𝐾))] 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐾[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − 𝑃𝜌𝐵𝐾 + 𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀)] + (1 − 𝐾)[𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − 𝑃𝜌𝐵𝐾 + 𝛾(𝑃𝜌𝑥 −𝑀)] 
𝑞𝐵 = 𝐵(1 − 𝐵) − 𝑃𝜌𝐵𝐾 + 𝐾(𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀)) + (1 − 𝐾)𝛾(𝑃𝜌𝑥 − 𝑀) 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵




𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 
Inserting the price in gamma: 
𝛾 =
𝐾 (𝑞 + 𝐵 +
𝐾




𝐾 (1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵 𝑃𝜌
(𝑥 − 𝑀) +
(1 − 𝐾)
𝐵 𝛾
(𝑃𝜌𝑥 −𝑀) + 𝐵 +
𝐾
















𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) = 𝐾 (−𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵







𝛾𝑥(1 − 𝐾) − 𝐾
(1 − 𝐾)
𝐵
𝛾(𝑃𝜌𝑥 −𝑀) = 𝐾 (−𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵




𝛾 (𝑥(1 − 𝐾) − 𝐾
(1 − 𝐾)
𝐵
(𝑃𝜌𝑥 −𝑀)) = 𝐾 (−𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵


















In equilibrium,  





















Conditions on parameters of Equilibrium 3: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 
Substituting rho for its equilibrium expression, the price becomes: 









The expression of optimal B is: 
1
2𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) −
1
2𝑥
√(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
The upper bound on c that results from the price schedule (the requisite that c must be such that 
there is a positive amount of bonds (B) that can raise c at the prevailing market price) is the 










Let us call this upper bound 𝑐∗. 









 is always satisfied. 
𝑀
𝑃𝑥
< 1 implies: 











𝛾 > 0 implies: 









+𝑀𝐾 < 0 
𝐵 (𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2
)) < 𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) 
If 𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2






− 𝑥), gamma is greater than 
0. 






− 𝑥) 𝑀2. 
If 𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2
) > 0, then: 
𝐵 <
𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀)






Substituting B for its equilibrium expression: 
1
2𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) −
1
2𝑥
√(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) <
𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀)






(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) −
𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀)






√(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) −
2𝑥𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀)
(𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2))
< √(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 




(𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2))
< √(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
 
If (𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) (𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2
)) − 2𝑥𝑀𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀) < 0, this is satisfied and gamma is greater 
than 0.  
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2




+𝑀𝐾) −𝑀𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2




) + 𝑥𝑀𝐾 −𝑀𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2
) −𝑀2𝐾2 < 2𝑥2𝐾𝑀 − 2𝑥𝐾𝑀2 
0 < 2𝑥2𝐾𝑀 − 2𝑥𝐾𝑀2 +𝑀2𝐾2 +𝑀𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2




−𝑀2(2𝑥𝐾 − 𝐾2) + 𝑀(𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2
) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥2𝐾) − 𝑥 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2
) > 0 
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𝑀2(2𝑥𝐾 − 𝐾2) − 𝑀 (𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2
) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥2𝐾) + 𝑥 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2
) < 0 
If 2𝑥𝐾 − 𝐾2 > 0 
2𝑥𝐾 > 𝐾2 











2 ) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥
2𝐾 + √(𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2 ) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥
2𝐾)
2










2 ) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥
2𝐾 − √(𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾𝑥
2 ) − 𝑥𝐾 + 2𝑥
2𝐾)
2


































This always holds. So both zeros of the parabola are positive. 
Let us call these 𝑀3 and 𝑀4, respectively. 
If 𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2
) > 0 and (𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) (𝑀𝐾 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾
2
)) − 2𝑥𝑀𝐾(𝑥 −𝑀) > 0, gamma is 
positive if and only if: 
𝑐 <









































Let us call this 𝑐∗∗∗. 
To sum up, 𝛾 > 0 holds if: 
 𝑀 < 𝑀2 or 
 𝑀 > 𝑀2 but 𝑀 < 𝑀3 or 
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𝛾 < 1 implies: 
𝐾2𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀)
𝐵










This implies that (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
+𝑀𝐾2) > 0, because the lhs is positive, by assumption. Re-








Let us call this 𝑀1. 














Substituting B for its equilibrium expression: 
1
2𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) −
1
2𝑥


















√(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 






> √(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2 + 𝑀𝐾





> √(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)2 + 4𝑥(𝐾𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) − 𝑥𝑐) 
This requires that (𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾) (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
+𝑀𝐾2) − 2𝑥𝐾2𝑀(𝑥 −𝑀) > 0, because the 
denominator of the lhs and the rhs are positive. 
Then  
(𝑥 − 𝑀𝐾)(𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2




) + 𝑥(𝑀𝐾2) − 𝑀𝐾(𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2




) +𝑀𝑥𝐾2 −𝑀𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2




) +𝑀𝑥𝐾2 −𝑀𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
) +𝑀2(2𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾3) > 2𝑥2𝐾2𝑀 
𝑀2(2𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾3) + 𝑀(𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
) − 2𝑥2𝐾2) + 𝑥 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
) > 0 
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Concavity of the parabola: 
(2𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾3) > 0 
2𝑥𝐾2 > 𝐾3 





This does not hold in this equilibrium, so this parabola is turned upside-down. 
Solution: 
−(𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2












−(𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2












(𝑥𝐾2 − 𝐾 (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
) − 2𝑥2𝐾2) > 0 
(𝑥𝐾 − (𝑥2 −
𝐾2𝑥
2
) − 2𝑥2𝐾) > 0 
(𝐾 − (𝑥 −
𝐾2
2
) − 2𝑥𝐾) > 0 
(𝐾 − 𝑥 +
𝐾2
2


























) > 𝑥 




And both zeros are positive. 
Let us call these 𝑀5 and 𝑀6. 








(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)(𝑀𝐾2 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾2
2 )) − 2𝑥𝑀𝐾
2(𝑥 −𝑀)






















(𝑥 −𝑀𝐾)(𝑀𝐾2 + 𝑥 (𝑥 −
𝐾2
2 )) − 2𝑥𝑀𝐾
2(𝑥 − 𝑀)









Let us call this 𝑐∗∗∗∗. 
To sum up, 𝛾 < 1 requires: 
 𝑀 > 𝑀1 and 
 𝑀5 < 𝑀 < 𝑀6 and 








































































































































15. Proof of Lemma 6 
Lemma 6: There exists a set of parameters x, M, K and P for which 𝑐′′ in Equilibrium 3 is 
higher than 𝑐′ in Equilibrium 2. 
Example for 𝑥 = 0,09; 𝐾 = 0,4 and 𝑃 = 0,7: 
 





upper bound on c
c' in Equilibrium 2 and c c'' in Equilibrium 3




16. Proof of Lemma 7 
(Figure 6: Inspection mechanism that implements lending for the highest c) 
Lemma 7: The inspection mechanism that restores lending for the highest c is: 


































For the proof we need the following Lemmas: 
































𝑀𝐾(2𝑥 −𝑀𝐾 − 4𝑥2 + 4𝑥𝑀)
4𝑥2
 
𝑀𝐾(2𝑥 −𝑀𝐾 − 4𝑥2 + 4𝑥𝑀)
4𝑥2
> 𝑀 
𝐾(2𝑥 −𝑀𝐾 − 4𝑥2 + 4𝑥𝑀) > 4𝑥2 
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𝐾(−𝑀𝐾 + 4𝑥𝑀) > 4𝑥2 − 𝐾(2𝑥 − 4𝑥2) 
𝐾𝑀(−𝐾 + 4𝑥) > 4𝑥2 − 𝐾(2𝑥 − 4𝑥2) 
𝑀(−𝐾 + 4𝑥) >
4𝑥2 − 𝐾(2𝑥 − 4𝑥2)
𝐾
 
𝑀(−𝐾 + 4𝑥) >
4𝑥2 + 𝐾4𝑥2 − 2𝑥𝐾
𝐾
 
𝑀(−𝐾 + 4𝑥) >
4𝑥2(1 + 𝐾) − 2𝑥𝐾
𝐾
 
𝑀(−𝐾 + 4𝑥) > 4𝑥2 (
1
𝐾
+ 1) − 2𝑥 

















𝐾 + 1) − 2𝑥
(4𝑥 − 𝐾)
 
















+ 𝐾2 − 4𝑥𝐾) +𝑀(4𝑥2 +
8𝑥2𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2
− 2𝑥𝐾 + 4𝑥2𝐾) + 𝑥2 < 0 












− 2𝑥𝐾 + 4𝑥2𝐾) + √(4𝑥2 +
8𝑥2𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2


















− 2𝑥𝐾 + 4𝑥2𝐾) − √(4𝑥2 +
8𝑥2𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2












Still, using mathematica, we see that this expression is negative when x<K^2/2: 
 













In region 1, commitment dominates, because no commitment does not restore lending, there. 
















𝐾2 − 4𝑥𝐾) +𝑀 (4𝑥2 +
8𝑥2𝐾
2𝑥−𝐾2
− 2𝑥𝐾 + 4𝑥2𝐾) + 𝑥2 < 0. 
In region 3, commitment dominates, because dominance in region 2 implies dominance in 
region 3, since the upper bound on c under commitment is the same and the upper bound on c 
under no commitment is lower (under no commitment, c is now bounded by 𝑐∗∗∗ < 𝑐∗). 










, if 𝑥 <
𝐾
4















Commitment deterring M M Commitment c 0 M
No commitment gamma 0 M3 M No commitment gamma 1 M1 M
No commitment gamma 1 M5 M No commitment rho 1


































In region 6, commitment dominates, because dominance in region 4 implies dominance in 
region 6, since the upper bound under commitment is the same and the upper bound under no 
commitment is lower (under no commitment, it is 𝑐∗∗∗ < 𝑐∗). 
In region 7, commitment dominates, because dominance in region 6 implies dominance in 
region 7, since the upper bound on commitment and the upper bound on no commitment are 
unchanged. 
In region 8, commitment dominates, because no commitment does not restore lending, there 
and commitment does. 
In region 9, commitment dominates, because no commitment does not restore lending there and 
commitment does. 
In region 10, no mechanism dominates the other, since both are a zero lending equilibrium, 
there. 



























)2 is positive in 









 is positive, since the function 𝑞𝐵 at the prevailing market 
price (𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀)) has a positive maximizer and takes a positive value 
when 𝐵 = 0 as long as 𝑥 > 𝑀. Therefore, since 𝑞𝐵 is concave, its maximum is necessarily 
positive as long as  𝑥 > 𝑀, which happens, since, in this equilibrium, 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀. 
Q.E.D. 
17. Proof of Lemma 8 
Lemma 8: When 𝑃 <
1
2
, the regime that implements lending for the highest c for a type 1 
government is “no mechanism” if 𝑀 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀′, 𝑃𝐾 (
2−𝑃𝐾
4
) ,𝑀2, 𝑀3} or 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀







 when 𝑥 <
𝐾
2
 and if 𝑀 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑀′, 𝑃𝐾 (
2−𝑃𝐾
4




Lemma 8 results from the following Lemmas: 
Lemma 11: When 𝑃 <
1
2
, for given x, K, and M, a mechanism in which lenders commit to 











Lemma 12: When 𝑃 <
1
2
, for given x, K and M, a mechanism in which lenders do not commit 




 and 𝑀 < 𝑀3 or  




Let us consider the case: 
𝑀 < 𝑀3 
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When the binding constraint in the no commitment mechanism is the price schedule, that is, for 
𝑀 < 𝑀3, the commitment mechanism restores lending for higher values of c than no 
mechanism, because the price schedule is higher. 
Price schedule under no mechanism: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝐾 
Price schedule under the no commitment mechanism: 
𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵 − 𝑃𝜌𝐾 +
𝐾
𝐵
𝑃𝜌(𝑥 − 𝑀) 
Since 𝜌 < 1 in equilibrium and 𝑥 > 𝑀 when 𝑃𝑥 > 𝑀, the price schedule under the no 
commitment mechanism is necessarily higher than that under no mechanism. 
Lemma 13: Equilibrium 2 under the commitment mechanism provides lending for higher 
values of c than “no mechanism” if and only if: 
Comparing binding upper bounds: 












(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2







(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2
) + 𝑃𝑥 
1
4
(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀






− 𝑀 + 𝑃𝑥 
(1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
)
2
) > 𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥 
1 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝑃𝐾𝑥
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾) (
4𝐾𝑀
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
) +
(4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀)2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2





2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
(4𝑃𝐾𝑥 − 4𝐾𝑀)2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
> 𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥 
1 −
2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀 + 16𝐾2𝑀2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
> 𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥 
1 −
2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
+
16𝐾2𝑀2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
> 𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥 
1 −
2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾
2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2
+
16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
+
16𝐾2𝑀2
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
−
32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
> 𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥 
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2
+ 16𝐾2𝑀2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀 > (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2(𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) − 4𝑀 + 4𝑃𝑥) 
(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2
+ 16𝐾2𝑀2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀 > (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2(𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) + 4𝑃𝑥) − 4𝑀(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 
16𝐾2𝑀2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥𝑀 + 2𝑀(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 4𝑀(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 + (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
− 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2 > (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2(𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) + 4𝑃𝑥) 
16𝐾2𝑀2 +𝑀(4(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥 + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)) + (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2
− 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝑃𝐾𝑥(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2) + 16𝑃2𝐾2𝑥2 − (2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2(𝑃𝐾(2 − 𝑃𝐾) + 4𝑃𝑥) > 0 
This is a parabola turned upside, so this is satisfied if 𝑀 is lower than the left-hand-side zero 
(which is negative) or higher than the right-hand-side zero, which I denote 𝑀′ (its expression is 
written below (the lower expression, which is the right-hand-side zero).  
𝑀
<
−(4(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥 + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)) − √(4(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥 + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2))
2





−(4(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥 + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)) + √(4(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2)2 − 32𝑃𝐾2𝑥 + 2(1 − 𝑃𝐾)4𝐾(2𝑥 − 𝐾2 + 2𝑃𝐾2))
2





−(𝟒(𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐)𝟐 − 𝟑𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐𝒙 + 𝟐(𝟏 − 𝑷𝑲)𝟒𝑲(𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐)) − √(𝟒(𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐)𝟐 − 𝟑𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐𝒙 + 𝟐(𝟏 − 𝑷𝑲)𝟒𝑲(𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐))
𝟐
− 𝟔𝟒𝑲𝟐((𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐)𝟐 − 𝟐(𝟏 − 𝑷𝑲)𝟒𝑷𝑲𝒙(𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐) + 𝟏𝟔𝑷𝟐𝑲𝟐𝒙𝟐 − (𝟐𝒙 − 𝑲𝟐 + 𝟐𝑷𝑲𝟐)𝟐(𝑷𝑲(𝟐 − 𝑷𝑲) + 𝟒𝑷𝒙))
𝟑𝟐𝑲𝟐
 



















Region 1: “no mechanism” achieves a higher upper bound and a higher price (since the payoff 
function of a type 1 is always the same, its payoff is determined by the price)  
Region 2: “no mechanism” attains a higher upper bound on c and the price depends on c 




Fixed Penalty, Efficiency for P 1 2 with new Eq.
Commitment deterring M M Commitment c 0 M
No commitment gamma 0 M2 M No commitment gamma 0 M3 M
No commitment gamma 1 M1 M No commitment gamma 1 M5 M
No commitment rho 1 IC lenders high penalty M
Commitment higher c M no mechanism












Region 4: “no mechanism” attains a lower upper bound on c and a lower price 
Region 5: “no mechanism” attains a lower upper bound on c and a lower price 
 
 
